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APPELLATE PROCEDURE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The following survey article' discusses the most important elements of
appellate procedure in New Mexico-jurisdiction, finality of judgments,
and the scope and standard of review. A number of recent supreme
court and court of appeals cases demonstrate the importance to the
practitioner of understanding the basic elements of appellate procedure.
Unless otherwise noted, the authors have limited this article to civil
appeals from the district court in an attempt to present a concise yet
comprehensive analysis of appellate procedure.
II.

JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

After entry of a final judgment 2 by a district court in a civil action,
a party has thirty days to file a notice of appeal with that district's
court clerk. 3 The notice of appeal should specify the name of the appellant
and appellee, the name and address of the appellate counsel, and the
name of the court. 4 Post-trial motions, such as a motion for j.n.o.v. or
a motion for a new trial, do not extend the thirty-day time limit.5
A party may make a motion with the district court to extend the time
for filing the notice of appeal. 6 Where such a motion is filed within
thirty days from the entry of the final judgment or order, and where
the moving party has demonstrated good cause for the delay, the district
court may extend the time for filing up to thirty additional days. 7 The
district court judge most likely abuses his discretion by refusing to grant
motions to extend the time to file the notice of appeal.8 If the thirtyday time limit for filing the notice of appeal has expired, the district
court may extend the time for filing only up to thirty days upon the
moving party's demonstration of excusable neglect or circumstances beyond its control. 9 The district court may not grant a motion for extension

1. This article covers all applicable cases from August 1990 to August 1991.
2. See infra section II(B) for a discussion on what decisions are reviewable on appeal.
3. N.M. R. APp. P. 12-201(A); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1991). A party appealing

the final judgment of an administrative agency has thirty days to file the notice of appeal with the
appellate court clerk. N.M. R. ApP. P. 12-601(B).
4. N.M. R. APp. P. 12-202(B).
5. Id. 12-201(D).

6. Id. An appellee may collect damages up to 10% of the judgment from an appellant who
files a frivolous appeal. N.M. R. App. P. 12-403(B)(4); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-27 (Repl. Pamp.
1991). Therefore, such extensions of time may be useful as they allow a party additional time to
research and prepare for issues that will arise on appeal, reconsider the costs and benefits of further
litigation, attempt to negotiate a settlement, or seek new counsel.
7. N.M. R. APp. P. 12-201(EXI).
8. Guess v. Gulf Ins., 94 N.M. 139, 143, 607 P.2d 1157, 1161 (1980).
9. N.M. R. APP. P. 12-201(EX2). Prior to the 1990 amendment, language in rule 201(E) technically
allowed the district court to extend the time indefinitely. The 1990 amendment limits the amount of
time to 30 days.
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of time after sixty days from the time the appealable order was entered. 0
Failure to file the notice of appeal within thirty days has traditionally
been held to deprive the appellate courts of jurisdiction." The appellate
court needs jurisdiction before it can hear the case on the merits. 2 As
a matter of practice, the courts liberally construe the rules of appellate
procedure, including rule 201(A), so that they can determine cases on
their merits. 3 Yet, the courts have also warned practitioners to conform
to the rules or "suffer the pangs of outrageous misfortune"' 4-summary
dismissal of the appeal.
A.

Place of Filing Requirements
The supreme court has original appellate jurisdiction over appeals from
the district court in which one or more of the counts of the complaint
allege breach of contract, appeals from the Public Service Commission,
removals from the State Corporation Commission, and from the granting
of writs of habeas corpus. 5 The court of appeals' jurisdiction is limited
to those appeals not included in the supreme court's original appellate
6
jurisdiction.'

Failure to direct an appeal to the appropriate appellate court is not
a fatal mistake." Yet, getting the process started by filing a timely notice
of appeal with the district court may be extremely important. Since 1989,
two supreme court cases" and three court of appeals cases 9 have addressed

10. Id. 12-201(E)(4).
11. See Public Serv. Co. v. Wolf, 78 N.M. 221, 430 P.2d 379 (1967); Board of Educ., Penasco
Indep. School Dist. No. 4 v. Rodriguez, 77 N.M. 309, 422 P.2d 351 (1966); Miller v. John Doe,
70 N.M. 432, 374 P.2d 305 (1962); Labansky v. Labansky, 107 N.M. 425, 759 P.2d 1007 (Ct. App.
1988); In re Jasso, 107 N.M. 75, 752 P.2d 790 (Ct. App. 1987); Chavez-Rey v. Miller, 99 N.M.
377, 658 P.2d 452 (Ct. App. 1982); Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Kurth, 96 N.M. 631, 633
P.2d 1229 (Ct. App. 1980); Brazfield v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co., 93 N.M. 417, 600 P.2d
1207 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 93 N.M. 205, 598 P.2d 1165 (1979). But see Govich v. North Am.
Sys., Inc., 112 N.M. 226, 814 P.2d 94 (1991).
12. Rice v. Gonzalez, 79 N.M. 377, 444 P.2d 288 (1968); Davidson v. Enfield, 35 N.M. 580, 3
P.2d 979 (1931); Brazfield v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co., 93 N.M. 417, 600 P.2d 1207 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 93 N.M. 205, 598 P.2d 1165 (1979).
13. See generally Public Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Catron, 98 N.M. 134, 646 P.2d 561 (1982) (because
clerk of court had closed office for Good Friday afternoon, appellant's notice of appeal filed three
days after expiration of thirty day limit was held timely); State v. Peppers, 110 N.M. 393, 796 P.2d
614 (Ct. App. 1990) (untimely filing of criminal appeal presumptively held, to be consequence of
ineffective assistance of counsel and will be treated as if filed in a timely fashion); Archuleta v.
New Mexico State Police, 108 N.M. 543, 775 P.2d 745 (Ct. App.) cert. denied, 108 N.M. 354, 772
P.2d 884 (1989) (thirty-day limit to file notice of appeal not applicable to rule 1-060(B) motions).
14. See, for example, Judge Sutin's warning in Weiss v. Hanes Mfg. Co., 90 N.M. 683, 685,
568 P.2d 209, 211 (Ct. App. 1977).
15. See N.M. R. App. P. 12-102(A).
16. Id. 12-102(B); see also N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 29.
17. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-10 (Repl. Pamp. 1990); "No matter on appeal in the supreme
court or the court of appeals shall be dismissed for the reason that it should have been docketed
in the other court, but it shall be transferred by the court in which it is filed to the proper court.
Any transfer under this section is a final determination of jurisdiction .... " Id.
18. Marquez v. Gomez, Ill N.M. 14, 801 P.2d 84 (1990); Lowe v. Bloom, 110 N.M. 555, 798
P.2d 156 (1990).
19. Torres v. Smith's Management Corp., Ill N.M. 547, 807 P.2d 245 (Ct. App. 1991); Singer
v. Furr's, Inc., Ill N.M. 220, 804 P.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1990); Martinez v. Wooten Constr. Co.,
109 N.M. 16, 780 P.2d 1163 (Ct. App. 1989).
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whether the failure to file the notice of appeal with the district court
creates jurisdictional error. The following section attempts to reconcile
these five cases and state the current law regarding place-of-filing requirements.
1. Lowe v. Bloom
In Lowe v. Bloom,20 Lowe failed to file the notice of appeal with the
district court within thirty days.2 ' Consequently, the New Mexico Supreme
Court dismissed Lowe's appeal from summary judgment." While Lowe
notice was
had filed his notice of appeal in a "timely fashion,''23 his
24 Five months
court.
district
the
than
rather
appeals
of
court
the
filed with
after the judgment was entered, Lowe's notice of appeal found its way
into the district court files.21 Lowe complied with all other rules of
appellate procedure. Pursuant to rule 12-202(D)(3), Lowe mailed copies26
appellees.
of the notice of appeal to the district court judge and to the
Lowe filed his brief-in-chief, after an extension, within the time allotted
by rule 12-210(B). 27 Lowe argued that the supreme court's jurisdiction
was invoked despite his failure to comply with the court's place-of-filing
requirements. 8 Arguing that he had "substantially complied" with the
rules of appellate procedure, Lowe claimed that the appellees were not
9
prejudiced by the defective notice of appeal.2
The court did not agree with Lowe that his failure to file notice of
appeal with the district court was only a "technical violation" under
rule 12-312.30 Recognizing that its appellate rules were to be liberally
construed in order to reach the merits of appeals, the court nevertheless
held itself to the long-standing rule that it could not exercise discretion
when it lacked jurisdiction.3 ' Finding itself in-step with the "majority
rule" the court announced that "the very concept of a timely filing...
includes the concept that the party has substantially complied with ap-

20. 110 N.M. 555, 798 P.2d 156 (1990).

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Lowe filed his notice of appeal just two days after the district court had entered summary
judgment against him. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 558, 798 P.2d at 159.
26. Id. at 555, 798 P.2d at 156. New Mexico Rule of Appellate Procedure 12-202(D)(3) states:
"The appellant shall give notice of the filing of a notice of appeal ... by serving a copy on the
appellate court, trial judge, tape monitor or court reporter who took the record and trial counsel
of record for each party other than the appellant."
27. Lowe, 110 N.M. at 558, 798 P.2d at 159. The appellant assigned to the general calendar
must file and serve his brief within thirty days after the entry of the transcript of the district court
proceedings. See N.M. R. App. P. 12-210(B).
28. Lowe, 110 N.M. at 556, 798 P.2d 157.

29. Id.
30. Id. New Mexico Rule of Appellate Procedure 12-312(C) states: "An appeal filed within the
time limits provided in these rules shall not be dismissed for technical violations of Rule 12-202
which do not affect the substantive rights of the parties."
31. Lowe, 110 N.M. at 555-56, 798 P.2d at 156-57; see also Johnson v. Johnson, 74 N.M. 567,

569, 396 P.2d 181, 183 (1964) (so far as jurisdictional defects are concerned there can be no exercise
of discretion).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

plicable place-of-filing requirements ..
-23.. The court concluded that
Lowe's mailing a copy of his defective notice of appeal to the district
court judge was not a "bona fide attempt to 'file' a notice of appeal
as that term is used in rule 12-201." '33
In holding that Lowe's failure to comply with the place-of-filing requirements of rule 12-202(A) could "not transform a jurisdictional defect
into a technical one, ' 3 4 the court overruled the court of appeals' holding
in Martinez v. Wooten Construction Co. 35 In Wooten, an employee,
Martinez, filed a notice of appeal with the Worker's Compensation
Division within thirty days from a Hearing Officer's decision that he
was temporarily totally disabled.3 6 Martinez did not comply with rule 12601(A), which requires that the notice of appeal be filed with the clerk
of the court of appeals.3 7 The construction company filed a motion to
3
dismiss the appeal.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals held that Martinez's failure to file
his notice of appeal with the clerk of that court did not deprive the
court of appellate jurisdiction.3 9 Characterizing Martinez's mistake as a
"technical violation," the court found that because the employer received
timely notice of Martinez's intention to appeal, it could not have been
prejudiced."0 The court found further support for their appellate jurisdiction in the legislative intent of New Mexico's Worker's Compensation
system that benefit claims be decided on their merits .4 As further support
for hearing Martinez's appeal, the court cited a statute that required the
transfer of appeals mistakenly filed in the supreme court to the court
of appeals and visa versa.4 2
The New Mexico Supreme Court in Lowe overruled the court of appeals
to the extent that Wooten suggested that failure to substantially comply
with the requirements of rule 12-202(A) results in merely a technical

32. Lowe, 110 N.M. at 556, 798 P.2d at 157. The court, citing only eight other state courts
which have held that failure to comply with place-of-filing requirements deprives the court of
jurisdiction, nevertheless declared it to be the "majority rule."
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 109 N.M. 16, 780 P.2d 1163 (Ct. App. 1989).
36. Id. at 16-17, 780 P.2d at 1163-64.
37. Id. New Mexico Rule of Appellate Procedure 12-601(A) states: "Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, direct appeals from orders, decisions or actions of boards, commissions, administrative
agencies or officials shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal or complaint on appeal with the
appellate court clerk ... within thirty (30) days from the date of the order, decision or action
appealed from."
38. See Wooten, 109 N.M. at 17, 780 P.2d at 1164.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 18, 780 P.2d at 1165 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-10 (Repl. Pamp. 1990)). It is
not clear why the Martinez court cited section 34-5-10 as this was not a case where an appeal
designated for the court of appeals has mistakenly been filed with the supreme court. The language
of section 34-5-10 does not necessarily indicate a general legislative preference against treating placeof-filing requirements as jurisdictional. By enacting section 34-5-10, the legislature may have made
a decision to narrowly expand the courts' appellate jurisdiction over a distinct set of cases-appeals
filed in the wrong appellate court.
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deficiency rather than a jurisdictional one. 43 Finding Lowe's reliance on

Wooten understandable," the supreme court nevertheless offered two
reasons why Wooten's precedential value should have been viewed with
skepticism. The supreme court noted that though the court of appeals
of appeals
denied the employer's motion to dismiss the appeal, the court
45 Moreover,
merits.
the
on
Martinez
against
rule
went on to summarily
Wooten case. 46
the court noted that certiorari was not sought in the
In his dissent to Lowe, Justice Montgomery accused the majority of
being "emptily formalistic" in addressing the question of whether the
place-of-filing requirements should be construed as jurisdictional in the
47
same way as the time-of-filing requirements. Justice Montgomery suggested that the court look beyond the mechanical language of rules 12201(A) and 12-202(A) and focus on the purposes and policies behind
those rules. 4" While filing the notice of appeal within the time allotted
by rule 12-201(A) serves the very important purpose of giving the court
and the opposing party notice of the moving party's intention to appeal,
filing the notice of appeal with the district court clerk does not serve a
similar purpose. 49 Attempting to come up with any remotely important
reason why the notice of appeal must be filed with the district court
clerk, Justice Montgomery posited:
No doubt it is helpful for the clerk to be notified that an appeal is
in the offing, but preparation of the record proper may not even be
begun until the clerk receives a copy of the docketing statement, as
provided in rule 12-209(B) .... Again, nothing in the appellate process
hinges on whether the district court clerk receives the original notice
of appeal, a copy ... or even any document at all purporting to
represent the notice of appeal.5
According to Justice Montgomery, the dismissal of Lowe's appeal because
he filed his notice with the court of appeals rather than the district court
simply failed to effectuate the purposes behind the rules of appellate
procedure. 5
43. Lowe, 110 N.M. at 556, 798 P.2d at 157.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 557, 798 P.2d at 158.
49. Id.
50. Id.

51. Id. Justice Montgomery listed three other reasons why he felt the court erred in dismissing
Lowe's appeal. First, Justice Montgomery felt that Wooten was correctly decided. Id. at 557-58, 798
P.2d at 158-59. Second, Justice Montgomery noted without elaboration the constitutional right to
one appeal. Id. (citing N.M. CoNsT., art. VI, § 2). For a discussion of how the constitutional right
to one appeal may affect place-of-filing requirements, see infra, text accompanying notes 103-137.
Finally, the circumstances in Lowe seemed to be a perfect case for applying rule 12-312(C). Lowe,
110 N.M. at 558, 798 P.2d at 159. The appellees did not discover that Lowe had mistakenly filed
his notice of appeal with the court of appeals until Lowe seryed them with a copy of his brief-inchief. Id. Appellees learned of Lowe's intent to appeal within a week of the district court's grant
of their summary judgment motion; for well over five months appellees had been preparing as if
the appeal had been filed correctly. Id. Because the appellees suffered no prejudice, Justice Montgomery
was apparently unimpressed by their contention that strict enforcement of rule 12-202 was necessary
to "preserve the integrity of the Court" and to "prevent abuses of the appellate process." Id.
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Justice Montgomery did not believe the court ought to prostrate itself
over its perceived jurisdictional boundaries. Justice Montgomery quipped:
[L]awyers and judges [tend] to think of the concept of "jurisdiction"
as if it were a thing-a kind of substance permeating the court, which
the court either does or does not have depending on whether there
has or has not been sufficient invocation to confer it. But jurisdiction
... is not something whose existence can be determined by looking
through a microscope or other instrument to see whether or not it
is there; jurisdiction is an intensely practical concept used basically
to tell lawyers and judges, and the general public, when a court will
entertain a case and when it will not. The rules prescribing and
delimiting jurisdiction should therefore be construed and applied in
similarly practical ways- to accomplish the objective of defining those
instances when a court will decide a controversy and when, presumably
for good reasons, it will refuse to decide. 2
Having explained his "definition" of jurisdiction," Justice Montgomery
concluded that Lowe's appeal should be entertained because "our judicial
system proceeds on the assumption that after a final judgment of a
district court the losing party is entitled to have the court's ruling reviewed
'54
on its merits."

2.

Singer v. Furr's, Inc.

The New Mexico Court of Appeals readdressed the question of placeof-filing requirements five months after the supreme court's decision in

52. Id. at 558-59, 798 P.2d at 159-60.
53. Justice Montgomery's definition of jurisdiction begs the question of when a court will entertain
an appeal. Asking when a court will entertain an appeal cannot be answered before asking why it
should decide a controversy.
The purposes of allowing appeals are two-fold. First, appeals allow for error correction and to
promote fairness in and reliance on the judicial system. This function or purpose of appeals has
been referred to as the "reviewing function." See R.A. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES

3 (1976); see also P.

OF APPELLATE COURTS
APPEAL 2 (1976).
Second,

CARRINGTON,

D.

MEADOR

&

M.

ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON

appeals ensure doctrinal and procedural uniformity among the lower
courts. As such attempts at unification sometimes involve quasi-legislative decisions, this function of
appeals has appropriately been referred to as the "lawmaking function." See R.A. LEFLAR, supra

at 4; see

also

CARRINGTON,

MEADOR

&

ROSENBERG,

supra at 2-3.

The court's power to promote fairness and uniformity is not unlimited. In New Mexico, the
courts' jurisdiction is prescribed by law and by the Constitution. N.M. CONsT., art. VI, §§ 1-3, 27,
29. Moreover, the appellate courts would be overwhelmed ifthey did not establish methods for
filtering out frivolous appeals. See generally Minzner & Donnelly, History of the New Mexico Court
of Appeals, 22 N.M.L. Rv.593 (1992). Thus, the supreme court has erected a number of procedural
hurdles which force an appeal to proceed in an orderly and timely fashion; these hurdles may also
dissuade vindictive or stubborn litigants from pursuing frivolous appeals.
54. Lowe, 110 N.M. at 559, 798 P.2d at 160. Justice Montgomery's dissent in Lowe was not
the first time he has indicated that he wants to see the tension between the court's desire to promote
fairness and uniformity and the court's constitutional duties and limitations resolved in favor of
giving a losing litigant a chance to be heard. Just two months before Lowe was decided, Justice
Montgomery stated in his dissent in Maples v. State, 110 N.M. 34, 791 P.2d 788 (1990): "Where
...there are two possible interpretations relating to the right to an appeal, that interpretation which
permits a review on the merits rather than rigidly restricting appellate review should be favored."
Id. at 42, 791 P.2d at 796.
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Lowe. In Singer v. Furr's, Inc.," the court of appeals dismissed an
employee's appeal of a worker's compensation award. The employee,
Singer, filed his notice of appeal with the Worker's Compensation Division
6
rather than with the court of appeals. Singer filed the defective notice
two weeks after the 5 7Worker's Compensation decision, well Within the
thirty-day time limit.
In response to the calendar notice's proposed dismissal of the appeal,
because Lowe
Singer asked the court to distinguish his case from Lowe
5 8 Singer argued
12-202(A).
rule
to
pursuant
initiated
appeals
was limited to
requirements of rule
that his failure to comply with the place-of-filing
5 9 In support of that contention,
error.
jurisdictional
in
result
not
12-601 did
Singer claimed that the rules of appellate procedure should be construed
appeals. 60
more liberally in workers' compensation cases than in other
Though Lowe was not a workers' compensation case, the court found
the supreme court's overruling of Wooten an indication that the supreme
court meant Lowe to stand for the proposition that "notices of appeal
must be timely filed in the correct tribunal," including appeals arising
under rule 12-601.61 As for Singer's contention that workers' compensation
appeals were deserving of a different standard than other appeals, the
court failed to see any reason for creating such a distinction and, in
light of Singer's failure to cite any authority for such a proposition,
appeals from the jurisdictional
refused to exempt workers' compensation
requirements of rule 12-601(B). 6 2
3. Marquez v. Gomez
Having applied the supreme court's holding in Lowe to Singer, the
New Mexico Court of Appeals next sought to apply Lowe retroactively.
In Marquez v. Gomez, 63 however, the New Mexico Supreme Court again
pulled the rug from under the court of appeals and its treatment of
place-of-filing requirements.
In late 1988, the court of appeals had proposed summary reversal of
a trial court's order granting summary judgment against Ramon and
Viola Marquez in their wrongful death action on behalf of their deceased
son." Eighteen months later, as a result of the decision in Lowe, "the
court of appeals directed the Marquezes to show cause why their appeal
should not be dismissed for failure to timely file notice of appeal in the
district court." ' 65 The Marquezes had filed their notice of appeal with

55. 111 N.M. 220, 804 P.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1990).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.at 221, 804 P.2d at 412.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 111 N.M. 14, 801 P.2d 84 (1990).
64. Id.at 14, 801 P.2d at 84.
65. Id.
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the court of appeals rather than the district court.66 Other than filing
their notice of appeal with the wrong court, the Marquezes complied
with all other rules of appellate procedure. Bound by the decision in
Lowe, however, the court of appeals dismissed the Marquezes' appeal. 67
In an opinion that lacked the extensive analysis of Lowe, the supreme
court reversed the court of appeals dismissal of the Marquezes' appeal.6
Because the Marquezes had filed their docketing statement with the district
court, and because the docketing statement "referred" to the notice of
appeal, the court held that "any objections to the insufficiency of the
filing must go to its content and not, as was the case in Lowe, to the
place the notice was filed or delivered."69 Thus, the failure of the
Marquezes to strictly comply with rule 12-202(A) was considered a technical violation that did not affect the substantive rights of the parties.70
The Marquezes' "substantial compliance" was enough to vest jurisdiction
in the court of appeals. 7
The court's conclusion hinged on its somewhat innovative finding that
the Marquezes' docketing statement could serve as constructive notice of
appeal.7 2 The court claimed that its finding of constructive notice was
supported by Johnson v. Johnson.7 1 In Johnson, the supreme court agreed
to hear an appeal to a quiet title action despite the fact that the appellant's
notice of appeal was denominated as a "motion" rather than as a
"notice. ' 7 4 The court stated that: "[t]o hold otherwise would quite clearly
be a step backward toward technical and formal procedure rather than
forward in the direction of liberal application of rules favoring disposition
of cases on the merits wherever possible, no question of jurisdiction
'75
being present.
The situation faced by the court in Johnson, however, is distinguishable
from that faced by the court in Marquez. Mrs. Johnson's "motion" for
appeal was filed with the district court and contained the information
required in a notice of appeal. 76 The court merely had to decide whether
the document in front of them complied with the rules for initiating an
appeal. 77 Thus, Mrs. Johnson's "motion" complied with the content and
place-of-filing requirements for the notice of appeal. 78 The Marquezes,

66. Id.
67. See Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973) (court of appeals is bound by
supreme court decisions).
68. Marquez, III N.M. at 15, 801 P.2d at 85.
69. Id.at 14-15, 801 P.2d at 84-85.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 15, 801 P.2d at 85.
73. 74 N.M. 567, 396 P.2d 181 (1964).
74. Id. at 569, 396 P.2d at 182.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. The Marquezes received an extension of time to file their notice of appeal from the district
court. Marquez, III N.M. at 14, 801 P.2d at 84. It is ironic that the Marquezes made their motion
for the extension of time to the district court judge, yet failed to file their notice of appeal with
that court's clerk.
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79
on the other hand, never filed a notice of appeal with the district court.
Unlike Johnson, the court in Marquez was required to find a wholly
different document-the docketing statement-to take the place of the
notice of appeal.8° The court's attempt to liken the Marquezes-whose
notice of appeal did not meet either the time or place-of-filing requirements-to Mrs. Johnson-whose notice of appeal was only deficient in
81
content-is not entirely convincing.
Regardless of whether the Marquezes filed their notice of appeal in
that the court had
the wrong place but within the right time, it is clear
2
to both stretch the precedential value of Johnson and ignore their earlier
decision in Lowe. What is not clear is whether Marquez overruled or
or whether the holding in Marquez is limited to the
distinguished Lowe,
83
facts of that case.

4. Reconciling Lowe with Marquez
To say that Lowe is distinguishable from Marquez because the Marquezes served a docketing statement on the district court clerk while Mr.
79. Id. The Marquezes complete failure to notify the district court of their impending appeal
stands in stark contrast with Elwood Lowe's sending a copy of his notice of appeal to the district
court within the time allowed. Lowe, 110 N.M. at 555, 798 P.2d at 156. Did Lowe's facsimile give
the district court any less "constructive notice" than the Marquezes' docketing statement?
80. Marquez, Ill N.M. at 14-15, 801 P.2d at 84-85. The information found in a docketing
statement is substantially more involved than the content required of a notice of appeal. The notice
of appeal need only specify the names of the appellee(s) and appellant(s) and the names and addresses
of their respective counsel and indicate whether the appeal is to be taken by the court of appeals
or the supreme court. N.M. R. App. P. 12-202(B). In contrast, the docketing statement must contain,
among other things, a statement of the nature of the proceeding, a statement summarizing all facts
material to a consideration of the issues presented, a statement of the issues presented and how they
arose and were preserved in the trial court, a list of supporting authorities, a reference to all related
or prior appeals, as well as proof that the appeal was timely filed. N.M. R. App. P. 12-208(B). The
docketing statement is to be filed with the appellate court clerk with a copy going to the district
court clerk. Id. Clearly, the docketing statement and the notice of appeal are substantially dissimilar
documents with completely different purposes.
81. Cf. Mitchell v. Dona Ana Savings & Loan. Ill N.M. 257, 804 P.2d 1076, cert. denied sub
nom. Avallone v. Martin, 112 N.M. 235, 814 P.2d 103 (1991), where the New Mexico Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals' dismissal of an appeal by an attorney sanctioned under rule
11 where the notice of appeal designated the client rather than the attorney as the appellant. The
court stated:
[The notice of appeal] made it clear to all concerned that it was Avallone and not
his client who was prosecuting the appeal ... where an appellant is obviously present
before the court and vigorously pursuing his case-although his name is missing
from the caption of the case and he has erroneously designated someone else as the
appellant-the court and all those concerned may yet have sufficient knowledge of
To decline
the parties and their positions to hear the merits of the case ....
jurisdiction over Avallone's appeal in this situation appears to us an exaltation of
form over substance.
Id. at 258, 804 P.2d at 1077. Ironically, though the facts and analysis in Mitchell invite comparison
to Johnson, the supreme court did not mention the twenty-year-old Johnson case, even though it
was the- lynch-pin in Marquez.
82. The use of Johnson is ironic in light of the supreme court's warning in that case which said:
Although we adopt a position of liberality, counsel desiring or attempting to appeal
should comply with the rules as promulgated and not rely on the court to overlook
departures therefrom. In other words, we propose to consider nonjurisdictional
deviation from the rules in each case as it arises. So far as jurisdictional defects
are concerned there can be no exercise of discretion.
Johnson, 74 N.M. at 569, 396 P.2d at 182.
83. Note that Justice Montgomery concurred with Justice Ransom's opinion in Marquez.
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Lowe sent only a copy of his notice of appeal to the district court judge

simply restates the question-why was the court's jurisdiction invoked
in one case and not the other?" The first opportunity to reconcile Marquez
with Lowe belonged to the court of appeals. 85 Bound to follow supreme

court precedent,86 the court of appeals was faced with the unenviable

task of deciding which was the rule and which was the exception-Lowe

or Marquez.
5. Torres v. Smith's Management Corp.
In Torres v. Smith's Management Corp.,87 the New Mexico Court of
Appeals dismissed an employer's appeal of a workers' compensation award
to its employee, Torres, because it was filed with the court of appeals
rather than the district court.8 8 The employer had filed the defective
notice within the thirty days allowed for filing the notice of appeal.8 9
The employer had also sent a copy of the notice of appeal to the district

court judge. 90

In response to the calendar notice's proposed dismissal of the appeal,
the employer asked the court to distinguish his case from Lowe because
Lowe should not apply in cases where "confusion and ambiguity exists
between applicable court rules and legislative provisions." 9' The employer

was appealing a workers' compensation award against it and section 52-

5-8 requires that appeals from the Workers' Compensation Administration
be filed with the court of appeals. 92 Thus, the employer argued, there

was a conflict between the court rule and a statute. 93

The court of appeals responded by pointing out that the case did not
originate with the Workers' Compensation Division, but came out of the

district court. 94 Moreover, the court cited Maples v. State95 for the

proposition that on procedural matters, a rule adopted by the supreme
court governs over an inconsistent statute. 96 Rule 12-202(A) governed the

84. What makes Marquez so difficult to reconcile with Lowe is the fact that Elwood Lowe, as
required by the rules of appellate procedure, sent a copy of his docketing statement to the district
court too. Lowe, 110 N.M. at 558, 798 P.2d at 159.
85. Torres v. Smith's Management Corp., .111 N.M. 547, 807 P.2d 245 (Ct. App. 1991).
86. Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973).
87. 111 N.M. 547, 807 P.2d 245 (Ct. App. 1991).
88. Id.at 549, 807 P.2d at 247.
89. Id.at 548, 807 P.2d at 246.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.at 548, 807 P.2d at 246.
94. Id.
95. 110 N.M. 34, 791 P.2d 788 (1990).
96. Torres, Il l N.M. at 548, 807 P.2d at 246. Maples was not the first time the court held a
rule adopted by the supreme court to trump an inconsistent statute where both purport to either
vest or divest the court with appellate jurisdiction. See Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez, Ill
N.M. 336, 805 P.2d 603 (1991); Southwest Underwriters v. Montoya, 80 N.M. 107, 452 P.2d 176
(1969); State v. Arnold, 51 N.M. 311, 183 P.2d 845 (1947). See generally Browde & Occhialino,
Separation of Powers and the Judicial Rule-Making Power in New Mexico: The Need For Prudential
Constraints, 15 N.M.L. REV. 407 (1985).

Summer 1992]

APPELLATE PROCEDURE

place-of-filing requirements for the employer's appeal, not section 52-5-9
8.91 Thus, the court rejected the employer's attempt to distinguish Lowe.
Upon concluding that the reasoning in Lowe controlled the disposition
99
of the case, the court then made passing reference to Marquez. Why
the court of appeals chose to apply Lowe over Marquez is not explained.
Neither Lowe nor Marquez involved workers' compensation claims. The
°°
court of appeals implied, however, that Lowe's overruling of Wooten' Lowe should
a workers' compensation case-was an indication that
01 The court of
appeal.
of
notice
misdirected
govern the employer's
appeals had already held in Singer that the place-of-filing requirement
for appeals from the Workers' Compensation Division (rule 12-601)
was jurisdictional.0 2 Thus, the court was merely taking the next step
by applying Lowe to workers' compensation cases which originate in
district court.
6. Govich v. North American Systems, Inc.
The court of appeals' valiant attempt to reconcile Lowe and Marquez
in Torres may have been in vain. Dicta from the supreme court in
03
Govich v. North American Systems, Inc. indicates that the court of
appeals has had the rug pulled out from under them once again.
In Govich, the supreme court overruled the defendant's motion to
dismiss the Goviches' appeal of a partial summary judgment order in
their products liability action.'°4 After having summary judgment entered
against them on their personal injury claims, the Goviches filed a timely
notice of appeal. 05 Shortly after entering summary judgment on the
issue of defendant's liability for the Goviches' personal injury, the
district court dismissed the Goviches' claims for personal injury and
property damage.'06 The Goviches filed timely notice of appeal to the
08
dismissal order.'0 7 The defendant moved to dismiss the first appeal.
Because the Goviches' property damage claim survived the summary

97. Torres, 111 N.M. at 548, 807 P.2d at 246.
98. Id.
99. Id. The court of appeals did not appear to have considered whether the Smith's Management
Corp. docketing statement gave the trial court constructive notice of their appeal.
100. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
101. Torres, 111 N.M. at 548, 807 P.2d at 246.
102. Id. at 548-49, 807 P.2d at 246-47.
103. 112 N.M. 226, 814 P.2d 94 (1991).
104. Id. at 229-30, 814 P.2d at 97-98.
105. Id. at 229, 814 P.2d at 97. The notice of appeal, mistakenly filed with the court of appeals,
was transferred to the supreme court pursuant to N.M. STAT. ANN. section 34-5-10.
106. Govich, 112 N.M. at 229, 814 P.2d at 97. The district court's order dismissing the Goviches'
claims arose in response to defendant's motion to compel answers to interrogatories. Because the
Goviches'
summary judgment order for all practical purposes dismissed the Goviches' claims (the
and
moot,
was
discovery
company),
insurance
their
to
subrogated
been
had
claims
property damage
Id.
suit.
the
dismissed
subsequently
the district court denied the motion and
to N.M.
107. Id. This second notice of appeal was also transferred to the supreme court pursuant
STAT. ANN.

section 34-5-10.

108. Govich, 112 N.M. at 229, 814 P.2d at 97.
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judgment against the personal injury claims; the court held that there
was no final order from which an appeal could be taken.' 9
The defendant then moved to dismiss the second appeal." 0 The defendant argued that because the second notice of appeal mentioned and
attached only to the order denying defendant's motion to compel and
dismissing the Goviches' suit, the Goviches' notice of appeal failed to
confer jurisdiction over the partial summary judgment order."'
The court disagreed with defendant's argument, classifying the Goviches'
second notice of appeal as only a technical violation of rule 12-202(B)." 2
The court held that the defendant had not been prejudiced by the technical
violation as the Goviches' intent to appeal the merits of the personal
injury claim was apparent from their filing of the premature notice of
appeal from the summary judgment order." 3 The court concluded that
the second notice of appeal was the functional equivalent of an appeal
from the partial summary judgment order and the order of dismissal." 4
The court then went on to address the case on its merits."115
Neither the time-of-filing requirements of rule 12-201(A) nor the placeof-filing requirements of rule 12-202(A) were relevant to Govich. Nevertheless, the court used Govich as an opportunity to reconcile Lowe
and Marquez." 6 The court stated:
While we recently held [in Lowe] that the appellate rules for time
and place of filing a notice of appeal govern the proper invocation
of our jurisdiction ... we also have stated [in Marquez] the policy
of facilitating the right of appeal by liberally construing technical
deficiencies in a notice of appeal otherwise satisfying the time and
place of filing requirements .... The constitutional mandate that "an
aggrieved party shall have the absolute right to one appeal" evinces
the strong policy in this state that courts should facilitate rather than
109. Id. New Mexico Rule of Civil Procedure 1-054(C)(1) provides that in the absence of an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay, an adjudication of fewer than all
the claims shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims and the order or other form of
decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all claims.
110. Govich, 112 N.M. at 230, 814 P.2d at 98. Tactically, the defendant hoped to stymie appellate
review of the underlying issue of comparative negligence and the rescue doctrine which had been
decided in the defendant's favor by the trial court on summary judgment. The Goviches' first appeal,
which sought to address the negligence issue, was properly dismissed by the court as premature. Id.;
see also the discussion of final judgments, infra notes 140-77 and accompanying text. The defendants
then hoped to limit review of the Goviches' second appeal to whether the trial court's dismissal of
the lawsuit was an abuse of discretion. Though unsuccessful, the defendant's strategy was certainly
clever. The court, after disposing of the procedural issue and agreeing to entertain the appeal of the
summary judgment, reversed and remanded for trial on the merits. Govich, 112 N.M. at 231-34,
814 P.2d at 99-102.
111. New Mexico Rule of Appellate Procedure 12-202(B) requires that a copy of the judgment
appealed from be attached to the notice of appeal. The defendant argued that if the Goviches had
wished for appellate review of the merits of their case, they would have also attached the summary
judgment order to their notice of appeal. Govich, 112 N.M. at 230, 814 P.2d at 98.
112. Govich, 112 N.M. at 230, 814 P.2d at 98.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 231-34, 814 P.2d at 99-102.
116. Id. at 230, 814 P.2d at 98.
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As a matter of terminology, we
hinder, the right to one appeal ....
properly should refer hereafter to the mandatory sections of our rules
of appellate practice as "mandatory" and discard the term "jurisdictional" that has been used over time by most federal and state
courts to describe a mandatory precondition to the exercise of jurisThough we have stated in categorical terms that we
diction ....
cannot entertain an appeal when the notice does not satisfy the
requirements for time and place of filing, what we in essence have
held is simply that, with respect to the mandates for time and place
of filing the notice of appeal, we decline to exercise discretion to
It
excuse or justify any improper attempt to invoke our jurisdiction.
2 17
is probably imprecise to say we cannot exercise such discretion.

To find jurisdiction to hear the Goviches' appeal of the summary judgment
order, the New Mexico Supreme Court did not have to challenge the
long-standing notion that the court has no authority to hear appeals
unless its jurisdiction has been properly invoked."" In fact, the court
cited two earlier cases where the content of notice rule was held not to
be jurisdictional." 9 Thus, the question arises-why did the court even
attempt to reconcile Lowe and Marquez, and what affect will the above
dicta have on defective appeals?
7. Does Appellate Jurisdiction Survive Govich?
The New Mexico Supreme Court's decision to treat the place and timeof-filing requirements as "mandatory" rather than "jurisdictional" must
have been more than a semantic exercise. Govich did not purport to
overrule Lowe. Though the dicta in Govich is open to a number of
interpretations, it is hard to imagine that the "emptily formalistic"
about by Justice Montgomery in Lowe will be
approach complained
20
resurrected.
One way to read the dicta in Govich, which purports to make place
and time-of-filing requirements "mandatory" rather than "jurisdictional,"
is that it represents a victory of substance over form. The supreme court
has often expressed concern that mere technicalities or procedures could
2
impede the search for justice and fairness.' ' The court may tolerate an

117. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
118. See vupra note 12 and accompanying text.
119. Govich, 112 N.M. at 230, 814 P.2d at 98 (citing Baker v. Sojika, 74 N.M. 587, 588-89, 396
P.2d 195, 196 (1964); Nevarez v. State Armory Bd., 84 N.M. 262, 264, 502 P.2d 287, 289 (1972)).
120. Lowe, 110 N.M. at 556, 798 P.2d at 157 (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
121. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dona Ana Say. & Loan Ass'n, 111 N.M. 257, 258, 804 P.2d 1076,
1077 (1991) ("While we admire the court of appeals' determination to proscribe 'sloppy practice,'
we feel that it might be better to tolerate a little sloppiness in the service of the few appellants
whose appeals might otherwise fall through the cracks for their lack of adherence to technicalities");
Lowe, 110 N.M. at 556-59, 798 P.2d at 157-60 (Justice Montgomery, dissenting); Public Serv. Co.
v. Cartron, 98 N.M. 134, 135, 646 P.2d 561, 562 (1982); Guess v. Gulf Ins., 94 N.M. 139, 143,
607 P.2d 1157, 1161 (1980) ("However strictly we interpret this rule, we cannot under the circumstances
ignore the position of Guess, the real party in interest, in this scenario. His complaint involves the
death of his wife and two children. The seriousness of the case is one of the many elements for
consideration .... "); Garver v. Public Serv. Co., 77 N.M. 262, 266, 421 P.2d 788, 792 (1966); see
also N.M. R. App. P. 12-312.
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appellant's failure to follow the rules for filing a notice of appeal except
where the appellee is prejudiced by such infractions. 22 If it is truly
imprecise to say that the appellate courts cannot exercise discretion over
time and place-of-filing requirements, as Justice Ransom suggested in
Govich, then practitioners who are delinquent in the protection of their
client's right to appeal ought not give up the vigorous pursuit of an

invocation of the courts' appellate jurisdiction. 123
On another level, the dicta in Govich may represent another round
in the court's on-going fray with the legislature over the scope of judicial
rule-making power.124 The supreme court, vested with the exclusive right
to prescribe and regulate pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
including lower courts, 25 is responsible for simplifying and promoting
the speedy determination of litigation upon its merits, 26 avoiding a
confusion in the methods of procedure, 27 and providing uniform rules
of pleading and practice. 2 The creation of a right of appeal, however,
is a matter of substantive law and outside the province of the court's
rule making power.

29

By treating time and place-of-filing requirements

as "mandatory" rather than "jurisdictional," the court appears to have
enlarged its appellate jurisdiction over appeals which previously would

have had to have been dismissed.

Finally, the dicta in Govich may represent a change in the court's
treatment of the constitutional right to appeal. Though the people of

New Mexico amended their constitution to guarantee an aggrieved party
the absolute right to one appeal, 30 the court's early response to the
amendment was cool.' 3 ' The court repeatedly held that the amendment
could not redress a criminal defendant's failure to comply with Rules

122. The New Mexico Court of Appeals recently found Govich to stand for the proposition that
the court may properly exercise its discretion and invoke jurisdiction if substantive rights of the
parties are not negatively affected thereby. State v. Alvarez, 113 N.M. 82, 823 P.2d 324 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 113 N.M. 23, 821 P.2d 1060 (1991).
123. After Govich, seeking certiorari over the dismissal of a defective appeal is unlikely to be held
to be frivolous or lead to the sanctions provided for in N.M. R. APP. P. 12-403(B)(4) and N.M.
STAT. ANN. section 39-3-27 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
124. See generally Browde & Occhialino, supra note 96; accord Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez,
I11 N.M. 336, 805 P.2d 603 (1991); Maples v. State, 110 N.M. 34, 791 P.2d 788 (1990); Southwest
Community Health Serv. v. Smith, 107 N.M. 196, 755 P.2d 40 (1988); Ammerman v. Hubbard
Broadcasting, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976); State v. Arnold, 51 N.M. 311, 183 P.2d 845
(1947); State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936).
125. N.M. CoNsT. art. VI, § 3; see also In re Motion for a Subpoena Duces Tecum, 94 N.M 1,
2, 602 P.2d 539, 540 (1980).
126. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-1(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
127. Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 310, 551 P.2d at 1357 (quoting State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 421,
60 P.2d 646, 661 (1936)).
128. Id.
129. Arnold, 51 N.M. at 314, 183 P.2d at 846.
130. N.M. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
131. See, e.g., State v. Garlick, 80 N.M. 352, 353, 456 P.2d 185, 186 (1969) ("We perceive of
no reason to consider that the amendment to the constitutional provision in any way altered the
effect of the court rule fixing the time in which the guaranteed right to appeal should be exercised.
That the appeal should be within a reasonable time which has been fixed at thirty days, as noted
above, is not in any sense a deprivation of the guaranteed right. It is nothing more nor less than
a procedural requirement which must be met to exercise the right").
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of Criminal Appellate Procedure.' 32 Ironically, the court began to warm
up to an aggrieved party's right to appeal only when the state claimed
33
to be the aggrieved party. In a number of cases,' the court held that
the amendment provided the state a right to appeal in a criminal
prosecution, though such appeals are generally prohibited by force of
the double jeopardy provisions of the United States and New Mexico
Constitutions. 3 4 In these cases, the court held that though it may
establish rules of procedure, in doing so it may not abridge or diminish
35
any right expressly provided by the Constitution.' Having held that a
rule of the court cannot deny an aggrieved party the right to appeal
in criminal cases,' 3 6 the dicta in Govich may have extended that holding
to civil cases.
8. Conclusion
Admittedly the affect Govich might have on appellate procedure is
speculative. What appears to be certain, however, is that the court will
no longer employ its place and time-of-filing requirements to limit access
to appellate review.' 37 It is probably optimistic to say that the court's
liberalizing place and time-of-filing requirements may actually 38alleviate
as the
some of the problems associated with its burgeoning caseload
on
cases
judging
to
job
courts'
increased discretion at least limits the
timeand
place
involving
cases
the
their merits. Because the majority of
of-filing requirements cited herein were decided in the last two years,
one has the sense that the issue has reached but a momentary culmination.
Decisions Reviewable-What Can Be Appealed?
A substantial concern affecting a party's right to appeal is whether
the appellate courts can review the order or judgment of the trial court.
Typically, the appellate courts follow the "finality rule" and will not
review a trial court 39 decision that does not completely dispose of the
merits of the case.
B.

132. See, e.g., Olguin v. State, 90 N.M. 303, 563 P.2d 97 (1977); Hudson v. State, 89 N.M. 759,
557 P.2d 1108 (1976).
133. See, e.g., Smith v. Love, 101 N.M. 355, 683 P.2d 37 (1984); State v. Aguilar, 95 N.M. 578,
624 P.2d 520 (1981); State v. Giraudo, 99 N.M. 634, 661 P.2d 1333 (Ct. App. 1983).
134. N.M. CONST. art. 11,§ 15; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-3(C).
135. Smith, 101 N.M. at 356, 683 P.2d at 38; see also State v. Galvan, 100 N.M. 769, 676 P.2d
1334 (1984).
136. Smith, 101 N.M. at 356, 683 P.2d at 38; see also State v. Watson, 82 N.M. 769, 487 P.2d
197 (Ct. App. 1971).
137. See, e.g., Johnson v. School Bd. of Albuquerque, 113 N.M. 117, 823 P.2d 917 (Ct. App.
1991). ("We decline to hold that an effective means of controlling our backlog is by dismissing
appeals because a document was filed in this court a few days late.").
138. See generally Minzner & Donnelly, supra note 53.
139. Floyd v. Towndrow, 48 N.M. 444, 152 P.2d 391 (1944).
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1. History, Purpose, and Use of the Finality Rule
a. History of the Rule
The New Mexico Supreme Court has found that it is without jurisdiction in matters where a trial court order lacks finality.' 4° The court
originally based its conclusion on a supreme court rule giving an aggrieved party three months to appeal from a "final judgment.' ' 4' This
rule, however, has since been repealed 42 and replaced by a statute that
vests appellate jurisdiction over final judgments in civil cases in both
the supreme court and court of appeals. 43 Interestingly, the supreme
court's review of "finality" cases has been extremely limited since the
addition of the court of appeals.'" Yet, as evidenced by its most recent
decision, the supreme court will construe the "final judgment" requirement in the statute like it construed the old supreme court rule. 145
The New Mexico Court of Appeals also holds that its jurisdiction is
limited to appeals from final judgments, interlocutory orders which
practically dispose of the merits of an action, and final orders entered
by a trial court after the entry of a judgment which affect some
substantial right of one of the parties.46 The court of appeals principally
has based its rulings on statutory law,' 47 but has also used the New
Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure,'" and the old rules of civil appellate
procedure.' 49 The court of appeals seems to draw from a wider array
of statutory and judicially created law when it seeks to determine whether

140. In re Quintana, 82 N.M. 698, 699, 487 P.2d 126, 127 (1971).
141. Floyd, 48 N.M. at 446, 152 P.2d at 393. The supreme court referred to 1917 N.M. Laws
ch. 43, § I (the old supreme court rule) as "1941 Comp., § 19-201(5)(1)".
142. 1971 N.M. Laws ch. 222, § 18.
143. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
144. The supreme court's most recent ruling on the finality issue came in Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc.
v. Kapnison, 113 N.M. 231, 824 P.2d 1033 (1992). To find a supreme court decision regarding the
finality rule before this case, however, one has to go back to Angel v. Wilde, 86 N.M. 442, 525
P.2d 369 (1974). In Angel, the court relied upon the old supreme court finality rule and divested
itself of jurisdiction. Id. at 443, 525 P.2d at 370. More recently, the supreme court clarified that
the dismissal of a counterclaim could only be brought by interlocutory appeal, B.L. Goldberg &
Assoc. v. Uptown, Inc., 103 N.M. 277, 705 P.2d 683 (1985), and denied certiorari in a case involving
a finality question. Lepiscopo v. Hopwood, 110 N.M. 30, 791 P.2d 481 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
110 N.M. 72, 792 P.2d 49 (1990).
145. In Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc., the supreme court restated the general rule that "an order or
judgment is not considered final unless all issues of law and fact have been determined and the case
disposed of by the trial court to the fullest extent possible." Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc., 113 N.M. at
236, 824 P.2d at 1038 (quoting B.L. Goldberg & Assoc. v. Uptown, Inc., 103 N.M. 277, 278, 705
N.M. 683, 684 (1985)). One should note, however, that the supreme court explicitly recognized that
this rule was not absolute. Id.
146. Watson v. Blakely, 106 N.M. 687, 690, 748 P.2d 984, 987 (Ct. App. 1987), overruled on
other grounds, Kelly's Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 113 N.M. 231, 824 P.2d 1033 (1992).
147. See, e.g., Thorton v. Gamble, 101 N.M. 764, 688 P.2d 1268 (Ct. App. 1984) (appellate
court's jurisdiction is limited by N.M. STAT. ANN. section 39-3-2 (Cum. Supp. 1984)).
148. See, e.g., Watson v. Blakely, 106 N.M. 687, 748 P.2d 984 (Ct. App. 1987) (court determined
that it did not have jurisdiction over an appeal based upon N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-054(C)).
149. See, e.g., Cole v. McNeill, 102 N.M. 146, 692 P.2d 532 (Ct. App. 1984) (court declared that
civil appeals may be taken from any final judgment or decision and based this declaration on N.M.
R. Civ. App. P. 3(a) (superseded by N.M. R. Ap. P. 12-201)).
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an order or judgment is not final. This may be the reason why the
supreme court's review of finality case has been so limited.
b. Purpose of the Rule
Both the New Mexico Supreme Court and the New Mexico Court of
Appeals have stated that the purpose behind the "final judgment"
requirement is to avoid "piecemeal" litigation. 5 0 Accordingly, the courts
have set up criteria to determine whether a judgment is final. First, a
judgment is not final unless it is in the form of a formal written order
or judgment."' In addition, the ruling of the trial judge must completely
dispose of all issues of law and questions of fact necessary to determine
the case."12 In order to make this determination the appellate court
looks at the substance of an order rather than its form so that it may
properly determine the effect of the judgment on the rights of some
or all of the parties. "3 If the effect of an order is to "practically
merits" of the case, then the appellate court will review
dispose of5 the
4
the order.
c. Use of Rule
The appellate courts find that many specific trial court rulings generally
are not final judgments. "5 Included in the list of non-final, non-ap"7
pealable orders are oral rulings,'5 " temporary restraining orders,' tem-

porary injunctions,'

s

denials of motions to amend complaints,'

9 dismissals

without prejudice,W actions involving multiple claims where the order
does not dispose of all of the claims,' 6' and orders awarding motion
for new trial. 6 2

150. Floyd v. Towndrow, 48 N.M. 444, 447, 152 P.2d 391, 392 (1944); Thorton, 101 N.M. at
767, 688 P.2d at 1271.
151. Bouldin v. Bruce M. Bernard, Inc., 78 N.M. 188, 429 P.2d 647 (1967).
152. Floyd, 48 N.M. at 446, 152 P.2d at 392.
153. Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Shively, 110 N.M. 15, 17, 791 P.2d 466, 468 (Ct.
App. 1989), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 704. 789 P.2d 1271 (1990).

154. Id.

155. For a more complete listing of non-final judgments see the notes following N.M. R. APP.
P. 12-201.
156. Bouldin v. Bruce M. Bernard, Inc., 78 N.M. 188, 429 P.2d 647 (1967); Miller v. Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 84 N.M. 321, 323, 502 P.2d 1011, 1013 (Ct. App. 1972) (Sutin, J., specially
concurring).
157. State ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Natural Mother, 97 N.M. 707, 643 P.2d 271 (Ct.
App. 1982).
158. Griffin v. Jones, 25 N.M. 603, 186 P. 119 (1919).
159. Clancy v. Gooding, 98 N.M. 252, 647 P.2d 885 (Ct. App. 1982).
160. Ortega v. Transamerica Ins. Co.. 91 N.M. 31, 569 P.2d 957 (Ct. App. 1977). But see Maiden
v. Getty Oil Co., 105 N.M. 370, 733 P.2d I (Ct. App. 1987) (dismissals without prejudice in workers'
compensation cases that are dismissed on grounds of prematurity are appealable because such dismissals
are sufficiently final; otherwise, worker would never be entitled to review on the merits).
161. Aetna Casulty & Sur. Co. v. Miles, 80 N.M. 237, 453 P.2d 757 (1969); Montoya v. Anaconda
Mining Co., 97 N.M. 1, 635 P.2d 1323 (Ct. App. 1981).
162. Labansky v. Labansky, 107 N.M. 425, 759 P.2d 1007 (Ct. App. 1988).
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2. Exceptions to Finality Rule
Two general exceptions to the finality rule exist. 63 First, in some
circumstances parties may appeal interlocutory judgments or orders that
do not practically dispose of the merits.'l The trial judge must certify
that the order or judgment involves some controlling question of law
and that an immediate appeal from the order may "materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation."'' 6 Even after the trial court
certifies the appeal, however, the appellate court is given the discretion
to deny the appeal.'" The appellate court must balance the orderly
process of appellate review against the need to have the legal issue
67
resolved before it will grant the appeal.'
The second exception to the general finality rule relates to multiple
parties and multiple claims. Where an action involves multiple claims,
the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts allow
a trial judge the discretion to enter a final judgment as to one or more,
but fewer than all, of the claims.'" This exception can be used only
if the trial judge "makes an express determination that there is no just
reason for delay."' ' The determination that there is no reason for delay
lies solely within the discretion of the trial court. 70 If the trial judge
does make
the determination, then the order is final and can be ap71
pealed.'
Furthermore, where an action involves multiple parties, the rules of
civil procedure give the trial court the discretion to enter a final judgment
"adjudicating all issues as to one or more, but fewer than all [of the]
parties.' 72 Such a ruling is considered a "final judgment" and can be
appealed even though such judgment would not practically dispose of
the merits of the entire case.'"7 The rule here, however, is that the
judge does not have to make an express determination of "no just
reason for delay."' 7 4 In fact, a party could lose their right to appeal
if a judge adjudicates all of the issues relating to that party and an
appeal is not taken within the requisite time frame because the judgment
is final as to that party when all issues are settled.' 75 The trial judge

163. Jurisdiction over extraordinary writs may count as a third exception but is not discussed
because extraordinary writs fall outside the scope of this survey article.
164. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1991). See N.M. R. App. P. 12-203 for the steps
that need to be taken to perfect an interlocutory appeal.
165. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
166. State v. Hernandez, 95 N.M. 125, 619 P.2d 570 (Ct. App. 1980).
167. Schlieter v. Carlos, 108 N.M. 507, 775 P.2d 709 (1989).
168. N.M. R. Ctv. P. 1-054(C)(1).

169. Id.
170. Navajo Ref. Co. v. Southern Union Ref. Co., 105 N.M. 616, 735 P.2d 533 (1987).
171. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-054(C)(1).
172. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-054(C)(2).
173. See Rivera v. King, 108 N.M. 5, 7, 765 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M.

785, 765 P.2d 758 (1988).
174. Id.

175. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Kurth, 96 N.M. 631, 633 P.2d 1229 (Ct. App. 1980).
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meant to be final in
can expressly provide that the judgment was not
76
which case the judgment cannot be appealed.1
3. Recent Cases
Two cases pertaining to the finality rule and appellate court jurisdiction
were decided by the New Mexico courts during the year covered by
this survey issue. 71 Both cases warrant review due to the particular
analysis that the courts provided in each case.
79
In State v. Webb, 78 the state charged Webb with capital murder.
Webb's counsel asked that the court allow medical tests to determine
if Webb was competent to stand trial. 80 The trial court held a hearing
and determined that Webb was incompetent and that he was dangerous.' 8'
The court ordered that Webb be detained in a secure facility. 82 Webb
appealed this decision. 83
The court of appeals found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear
the appeal because the order of the trial court was not a final judgment.
The court applied the Floyd v. Towndrow 84 definition of "final judgment" and determined that the order of the trial court did not practically
dispose of the merits of the case. 85 The court based this determination
on the fact that competency hearings are only one part of the criminal
process. 8 6 The court found that a ruling which requires a defendant
to be held over to determine competency in no way disposes of the
question as to the guilt or innocence of a party. 8 7 Thus, reasoned the
court, until the case is either dismissed, tried, or the defendant is
involuntarily committed, the ruling of the trial court is not final. 88
This case clarifies how the appellate courts will review cases regarding
the finality rule. As the court stated, it gave the term "finality" a
practical, rather than a technical, construction and looked at the substantive effect of the order of the trial court on the rights of the
defendant. 8 9 In this case, the court placed emphasis on the different

176. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-054.
177. State v. Webb, IIl N.M. 78, 801 P.2d 660 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, Ill N.M. 164, 803
P.2d 253 (1990); In re Forfeiture of $2,730.00, Il N.M. 746, 809 P.2d 1274 (1991). This article
does not do an analysis of Kelly's Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapinson, 113 N.M. 231, 824 P.2d 1033
(1992). Attorneys should read this case to see the supreme court's latest discussion of the finality
issue.
178. 111 N.M. 78, 801 P.2d 660 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, Ill N.M. 164, 803 P.2d 253 (1990).
179. Id.at 78, 801 P.2d at 660.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 48 N.M. 444, 152 P.2d 391 (1944).
185. Webb, Ill N.M. at 79, 801 P.2d at 661.
186. Id. at 80, 801 P.2d at 662.
187. Id.
188. Id.; see also In re Parnell, 92 N.M. 490, 590 P.2d 638 (Ct. App. 1979) (persons involuntarily
committed have the right to appeal the initial commitment).
189. Webb, Ill N.M. at 79, 801 P.2d at 661.
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stages of the competency proceeding. 19° It appears that the defendant
would have the right to appeal at any stage of the competency proceeding
except the one addressed in the case. 19 1 Had the attorney for the defendant in this case examined the effects of an order at each stage,
she might have avoided the jurisdictional defect.
The Webb decision also adds to the court's previous decisions regarding
the finality rule. 192 The court demonstrated that it will look to effects
of the trial court's judgment and will do what is possible to avoid
piecemeal litigation. Using a similar construction of the finality rule,
an appellate court could, for example, determine that an order granting
a new trial is not a final order because the effect of the order is to
stay the entry of the judgment of the case. On remand, an appellate
court could only order the trial court to enter the judgment, at which
time the losing party could appeal, or uphold the grant of a new trial
on substantive grounds and send the case back to the trial court for
a re-trial. Either way the trial court is forced to take some action to
dispose of the case before the parties can rightfully appeal the issues.' 93
During this survey period, the New Mexico Supreme Court also
reviewed an issue closely related to the finality rule. In In re Forfeiture
of $2, 730.00,194 the New Mexico Supreme Court decided the issue of
whether execution on a final judgment divested an appellate court of
jurisdiction. 95 The supreme court basically held that execution on a
final judgment does not necessarily divest the appellate courts of in
personam jurisdiction. 96
The case was actually a consolidation of two similar cases, one
involving the seizure of cash from James Mitchell and the other involving
97
the seizure of a 1984 Pontiac.
The issue in Mitchell's case revolved around the fact that the Farmington police seized cash from Mitchell claiming it was the fruit or
instrumentality of a violation of the Controlled Substances Act. 98 The
court entered a default judgment of forfeiture against Mitchell and the
City executed on the judgment by transferring the cash to the city

190. Id. at 79-80, 801 P.2d at 661-62.
191. Id.
192. The Webb decision does not merely reinforce the idea that only decisions which "practically
dispose of the merits" are appealable although the decision is based upon this concept. Rather, the
decision clarifies what the court will look at when reviewing finality decisions. In this case the court
of appeals looked to future possibilities (conviction, involuntary commitment) to determine that the
order was not final. Id.
193. The supreme court used this exact analysis in Cockrell v. Gilmore, 74 N.M. 66, 390 P.2d
655 (1964), where it determined that an order granting a new trial generally is not a final order.
This analysis has not yet been extended to orders granting new trials in criminal cases. See, e.g.,
State v. Ferguson, IIl N.M. 191, 803 P.2d 676 (Ct. App.) (court reviewed order granting new trial
but did not state basis for appellate court jurisdiction over case), cert. denied, I II N.M. 144, 802
P.2d 1290 (1990).
194. 111 N.M. 746, 809 P.2d 1274 (1991).
195. Id. at 747, 809 P.2d at 1275.
196. Id.
197. id.
198. Id.; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-31-1 to -41 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
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coffers.'9 Mitchell appealed in an effort to get his money back but the
court of appeals granted the City's motion to dismiss the case for lack
of jurisdiction. 200 Mitchell then appealed to the supreme court. 20'
The Pontiac case 20 2 had very similar facts. The State of New Mexico
sought forfeiture on the car and several thousand dollars. 20 a The owner
of the car failed to answer the state's complaint. 204 Without giving notice
to the owner of the Pontiac, the state filed a motion for default judgment
which the trial court granted. 20 5 The state executed on the judgment
before the owner could take any action and the owner appealed. 206 The
court of appeals reversed the trial court holding that the default judgment
had been improperly entered despite the state's claim that the court
lacked jurisdiction. 20 7 The state appealed the decision of the court of
2

appeals . 08
The supreme court consolidated the cases in order to determine whether
the appellate court had jurisdiction over a case after one party executed
on a forfeiture judgment. 209 Farmington and the state argued that the
court lost its jurisdiction over the judgments when the parties executed
on them. 210 The argument was based on the fact that forfeiture proceedings are classified as in rem proceedings. 21' Appellate courts only
have control over in rem proceedings when the court can "exercise
control over the defendant res. ' 21 2 Farmington and the state argued the
execution on the forfeiture judgment removed 2the
res from the court's
13
control and divested the court of jurisdiction.
The supreme court, however, did not agree. The court reviewed case
law and, relying on Devlin v. State ex rel. New Mexico State Police
Department,2 4 agreed that it would not have in rem jurisdiction if it
lost control over the res. 21 Yet, the court also found that Devlin
"recognized that in personam jurisdiction may exist concurrently with
in rem jurisdiction. 2 6

199. In re Forfeiture, Ill N.M. at 747, 809 P.2d at 1275.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. State ex rel. New Mexico State Police Dep't v. One 1984 Pontiac, 111 N.M. 85, 801 P.2d
667 (Ct. App. 1990), revMd sub nom. In re Forfeiture of $2,730.00, 111 N.M. 746, 809 P.2d 1274

(1991).
203. In re Forfeiture, III N.M. at 747, 809 P.2d at 1275.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 747-48, 809 P.2d at 1275-76.
210. Id. at 747, 809 P.2d at 1275.
211. Id. at 748, 809 P.2d at 1276.
212. Id.
213. Id. Farmington and the state relied upon Devlin v. State ex rel. New Mexico State Police
Department, 108 N.M. 72, 766 P.2d 916 (1988), for the holding that appellate courts do not have
jurisdiction over in rem proceedings when the courts do not control the defendant res.
214. 108 N.M. 72, 766 P.2d 916 (1988).
215. In re Forfeiture of $2,730.00, 111N.M. at 748, 809 P.2d at 1276.
216. Id. (citing Devlin, 108 N.M. at 74, 766 P.2d at 918).
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The court determined it had in personam jurisdiction on the basis
that, the state and city had invoked the jurisdiction and assistance of
the courts in order to initiate a forfeiture proceeding and thus confiscate
private property. 2 7 The court found that to allow a state entity to
invoke the power of the court in order to obtain and execute on a
judgment, and then have that entity argue that the court did not have
jurisdiction over the appeal, "would be intolerable. ' 218 Thus, the court
reversed the court of appeals in Mitchell's case and affirmed the trial
21 9
court in the case of the 1984 Pontiac.
This case is valuable because the court expressly dealt with the effect
that an execution on a final judgment has on a party's right to appeal.
The claimants filed their appeals in a timely manner and the parties
followed all other correct procedure. As was noted in the decision,
however, the record did not show that either Mitchell or the owner of
the car had moved to stay the judgments pending appeal. 220 Thus,
Farmington and the state seemed to have the right to execute on their
judgments. Under Devlin, this execution on the final judgment of the
trial court would divest the appellate court of in rem jurisdiction. 22'
Yet, the court found that the execution on the final judgment did
222
not supersede the right of the claimants to appeal a final judgment.
The court held that it has continuing in personam jurisdiction over any
party that starts forfeiture proceedings. 2 3 From a public policy standpoint, the court could not have decided this case any other way. As
the court recognized, it would be unfair to allow a party to use the
court's power to secure a final judgment and then claim the court did
not have jurisdiction.
Furthermore, had the court decided otherwise, parties would, in essence, be given the opportunity to rush out and execute on judgments
and divest the appellate courts of jurisdiction. This would, in effect,
completely wipe out an aggrieved party's right to appeal because the
appellate courts would lose jurisdiction over the matter. 224 By ruling as
it did, the supreme court preserved the finality rule and the right to
appeal in circumstances where a governmental entity seeks and obtains
a forfeiture judgment and then executes on that judgment. Thus, in
this instance, the execution on a final judgment does not supersede an
aggrieved party's right to appeal.

217. Id. at 748, 809 P.2d at 1276.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 750, 809 P.2d at 1278.
220. Id. at 748, 809 P.2d at 1276.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Attorneys should note, however, that the decision in this case did not overrule Devlin. Therefore,
the appellate courts still will be divested of jurisdiction when they lose control of the res. This implies
that an aggrieved party still might not have the right to one appeal when jurisdiction is solely based
on in rem jurisdiction.
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4. Conclusion
Although the supreme court and court of appeals have carved out
some exceptions, the general rule is that only final written orders or
judgments are reviewable. The test for finality comes down to a determination of whether the effect of an order practically disposes of
the merits of the case. 22 51 If the trial court can still act on the merits
of the case the appellate court generally will not review any trial court
judgment or order.
The practitioner should note that the finality rule can be both a help
and a hinderance to a case. Most of the time the finality rule acts to
bar an appeal. Thus, counsel wants an order or judgment deemed final
so that the case can proceed on appeal. Yet, there are times when a
practitioner should argue that an order is not final to avoid other
jurisdictional requirements. That is, if an attorney can argue that an
order is not final, then the attorney may be able to keep an appeal
22 6
from being dismissed for time-of-filing or place-of-filing defects.
III.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

After determining jurisdiction, appellate courts must determine whether
an issue falls within its "scope of review." This "scope of review" is
generally defined as "[t]he matters proper for consideration by an
appellate court upon review of a lower court decision. ' 22 7 Consequently,
an appellate court must determine whether an issue is proper for review
before it can instigate such review.
A.

Preservation of Issues
Typically, an appellate court will not review an issue unless the party
seeking review raised the contention or preserved the issue in the trial
court. 228 Because review on appeal is limited to a consideration of the
229
transcript on the record certified by the clerk of the trial court,
matters outside of the record created in the trial court will not be
considered on appeal. 230 This rule also extends to the docketing statement. 23' Further, prior to a recent amendment to appellate rule 12213(A) issues not raised in the docketing statement could not be argued

225. Floyd v. Towndrow, 48 N.M. 444, 152 P.2d 391 (1944).
226. In Lebansky v. Lebansky, 107 N.M. 425, 759 P.2d 1007 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M.
308, 756 P.2d 1203 (1988), the appellant attempted to circumvent time-of-filing requirements by
arguing that the trial court's judgment was not a final judgment due to the filing of post-trial
motions. His argument was unsuccessful because N.M. R. App. P. 12-201 specifically defined when
the time-of-filing requirement started. This may not always be the case and attorneys should try this
argument when possible.
227. BALLENTIIE's LAW DICTIoNARY 1145 (3d ed. 1969).
228. See Barnett v. Cal M, Inc., 79 N.M. 553, 445 P.2d 974 (1968).
229. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Rose Realty, Inc., 79 N.M. 281, 282, 442 P.2d 593, 594
(1968).
230. Adams v. Loffland Bros. Drilling, 82 N.M. 72, 76, 475 P.2d 466, 470 (Ct. App. 1970).
231. To see what is required in a docketing statement see N.M. R. App. P. 12-208.
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in an appellant's brief-in-chief without leave of the court. 232 In addition,
docketing statement which are not argued
issues that are listed in 23 the
3
are deemed abandoned.
In comparison, an appellate court will not review findings of fact
and conclusions of law if the party seeking appeal did not submit
findings and conclusions to the trial court. 234 Findings of fact that are
unchallenged become the facts upon which the case rests on appeal.235
Furthermore, unchallenged jury instructions become binding on the
court
parties and cannot be challenged on appeal. 236 Overall, appellate
237
review is limited to the record created in the trial court.
To make an issue part of the record, and thus properly preserve the
issue for review, the party seeking review must have made a specific
objection regarding the issue in order to invoke a ruling from the trial
court.2 38 General objections like "irrelevant and immaterial" without
further specification will not provide a basis for review. 23 9 The specific
objection rule applies in particular to review of 24the introduction of
evidence 240 and to the review of jury instructions. '
232. Compare N.M. R. Ap. P. 12-213(A) with N.M. R. App. P. 12-213(A)(3) (Recomp. 1986).
Cf. N.M. R. App. P. 12-210(D)(3) (current rule limits issues raised in memoranda opposing proposed
summary disposition to those issues raised in docketing statement); N.M. R. App. P. 12-210(D)(3)
(Recomp. 1986) (does not restrict issues).
In Maloney v. Wreyford, 111 N.M. 221, 804 P.2d 412 (Ct. App. 1990), the court of appeals stated
that it would not review issues brought up in an appellant's brief-in-chief if those issues were not
first addressed in the appellant's docketing statement. Id. at 225, 804 P.2d at 416. The continuing
validity of this holding is questionable, however, given the recent amendment to N.M. R. APP. P.
12-213(A). The amendment removed the language "[a] party shall be restricted to arguing only the
issues contained in the docketing statement" from the brief-in-chief rule.
233. State v. McGill, 89 N.M. 631, 632, 556 P.2d 39, 40 (Ct. App. 1976).
234. Smith v. Maldonado, 103 N.M. 570, 711 P.2d 15 (1985).
235. Begay v. First Nat'l Bank of Farmington, 84 N.M. 83, 85, 499 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 84 N.M. 77, 499 P.2d 999 (1972); see also Cordova v. Broadbent, 107 N.M. 215, 216,
755 P.2d 59, 60 (1988) (unchallenged trial court findings are binding on appeal).
236. Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 90 N.M. 414, 564 P.2d 619 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 90 N.M. 636, 567 P.2d 485 (1977).
237. Sears v. Anton Chico Land Grant, 83 N.M. 372, 492 P.2d 643 (1971); Trujillo v. Employment
Sec. Dep't, 105 N.M. 467, 743 P.2d 245 (Ct. App. 1987). Attorneys should note that if the transcripts
and briefs presented in the case are sufficient enough to preserve the issue on review then the court
will review the merits, even if the issue is not specifically preserved. Huckins v. Ritter, 99 N.M.
560, 661 P.2d 52 (1983). Practitioners, however, would be well advised to specifically preserve all
issues.
238. State v. Lopez, 84 N.M. 805, 809, 508 P.2d 1292, 1296 (1973); see also N.M. R. APP. P.
12-216. For a good discussion on preserving the record see Salvador, Some General Thoughts on
Preserving the Record, 20 N.M. TRIuAL LAW. 105 (1992).
239. State v. Zarafonetis, 81 N.M. 674, 676, 472 P.2d 388, 390 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 81 N.M.
669, 472 P.2d 383 (1970). An example of a specific objection would be objecting to the admission
of an opinion on the basis that a witness does not have the requisite expertise to form an opinion.
The objections of "irrelevant, incompetent, and immaterial," which were often shouted by Perry
Mason's counterpart, Hamilton Berger, probably would not pass the specificity requirement.
240. Williams v. Vanderhoven, 82 N.M. 352, 482 P.2d 55 (1971); see also N.M. R. EvID. 11-103
(objections to introduction of evidence must be timely made and specifically stated). Attorneys should
note that rule allows review of evidentiary questions where there are "plain errors affecting [the]
substantial rights" of the appellant. N.M. R. EvW. 11-103(D).
241. Grety v. Demers, 86 N.M. 141, 520 P.2d 869 (1974); see also Lewis v. Rodriguez, 107 N.M.
430, 739 P.2d 1012 (Ct. App. 1987) (to preserve error to a given instruction, a party must either
tender a correct instruction and alert the court that the new instruction corrected the defect, or
specifically point out what is wrong with the instruction given through a proper objection).
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B.

Exceptions to Preservation Rule
The courts have provided for some exceptions to the general rule
requiring preservation. 242 Appellate courts can still consider jurisdictional
questions, 243 questions involving the general public interest 244 or questions
involving a fundamental error or fundamental rights of a party, 245
regardless of whether the issue was preserved in the trial court. 246 Absent
a specific preservation, issues that do not fall within one
of these
247
exceptions may not be raised for the first time on appeal.
C.

Recent Cases
Three cases pertaining to issue preservation have been decided within
the survey period. 248 One case specifically deals with whether an issue
was properly preserved in the trial court. The other two cases pertain
to what issues can be raised for the first time on appeal.
1. Proper Preservation
In State v. Goss,2 49 police officers arrested Donal and Johnny Goss
at a roadblock for possession of marijuana. 2 0 The roadblock was to
be used only to check driver's licenses, proof of registration, and proof
of insurance. 25 ' The officers at the roadblock, however, smelled the
odor of marijuana in the Goss' automobile, giving them probable cause
to conduct a secondary search. 25 2 Upon inspection
of the automobile
25 3
the police discovered 831 pounds of marijuana.
Goss challenged the constitutionality of the roadblock arguing that
the roadblock violated the fourth and fourteenth amendments of the
Constitution, 25 4 the New Mexico Constitution, 255 and principles estab-

242. N.M. R. App. P. 12-216(B).
243. Id.; see also Johnson v. C & H Constr. Co., 78 N.M. 423, 432 P.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1967)
(jurisdictional questions can be raised at any time).
244. N.M. R. App. P. 12-216(B)(1); see also Pineda v. Grande Drilling Co., 111 N.M. 536, 807
P.2d 234 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Jasso, 107 N.M. 75, 752 P.2d 790 (Ct. App. 1987).
245. N.M. R. App. P. 12-216(B)(2). Attorneys should note that this exception usually only arises
in criminal law and constitutional law matters, Canada, Raising New Issues on Appeal, N.M. BAR
BULL., Oct. 17, 1991, at 11, and that the appellate courts have been very active recently in reviewing
criminal cases based upon fundamental error. See, e.g., State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 817 P.2d
1196 (1991); State v. Osborne, Ill N.M. 654, 808 P.2d 624 (1991).
246. N.M. R. App. P. 12-216(B).
247. State v. Aranda, 94 N.M. 784, 786, 617 P.2d 173, 175 (Ct. App. 1980). For a more complete
discussion of N.M. R. App. P. 12-216 see Canada, Raising New Issues on Appeal, N.M. BAR BULL.,
Oct. 17, 1991, at 11.
248. State v. Goss, 111 N.M. 530, 807 P.2d 228 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, Ill N.M. 416, 806
P.2d 65 (1991); Pineda v. Grande Drilling Co., 111 N.M. 536, 807 P.2d 234 (Ct. App. 1991); C.E.
Alexander & Sons, Inc. v. DEC Int'l, Inc., 112 N.M. 89, 811 P.2d 899 (1991).
249. 111 N.M. 530, 807 P.2d 228 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 111 N.M. 416, 806 P.2d 65 (1991).
250. Id. at 532, 807 P.2d at 230.
251. Id. at 531, 807 P.2d at 229.
252. Id. at 532, 807 P.2d at 230.
253. Id.
254. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, XIV.
255. N.M. CONST. art. II, sec. 10.
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lished under New Mexico case law. 25 6 The court of appeals, however,
found that the issue was not properly preserved in the trial court. 257
The court could not find in the record
any specific objections to the
258
constitutionality of the roadblocks.
The defendants argued that they had in fact raised the issue of
constitutionality in a motion to suppress the evidence found during the
roadblock search. 2 9 The court reasoned, however, that the motion to
suppress did not "set out with particularity the grounds relied on for
the relief sought. ' ' 26 0 In other words, the defendants did not expressly
call the constitutionality of the roadblock into question because the
motion to suppress did not specifically cite controlling case law. 261 In
addition, defendants' counsel could have questioned the officers who
set up the roadblock and briefed the motion to suppress, but did
neither. 262 The court held that the defendant, did not preserve
the issue
263
in the trial court and it could not be heard on appeal.
The court expressly recognized that the specificity requirement in
criminal cases was the same as in civil cases. 264 The court cited the
decision in National Excess Insurance Co. v. Bingham265 to support this
contention. In National Excess Insurance Co., the court held that a
movant is required to set forth the grounds for a motion with specificity. 2 66 If a party fails to do this then that party may be barred from
appealing the denial of the motion. 267 This interpretation of the specificity
requirement supports the proposition that general objections to issues
will not be sufficient to warrant appellate review.
Goss reaffirms New Mexico law and provides a good example of just
how specific an attorney may have to be in his or her objections on
an issue. If counsel is not specific enough, the court may find that the
issue was not properly preserved and cannot be reviewed.
2. Issues Raised For the First Time on Appeal
During the survey period, the court of appeals decided Pineda v.
Grande Drilling Corp.26 Although this case involved an administrative
law appeal, it is significant because it provides the most recent example
of the appellate courts' willingness to allow an appeal based on the
needs of the public interest. In Pineda, the New Mexico Court of

256. Goss, 111 N.M. at 532, 807 P.2d at 230 (citing a violation of the standards set down in
City of Las Cruces v. Betancourt, 105 N.M. 655, 735 P.2d 1161 (Ct. App. 1987)).

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 533, 807 P.2d at 231.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

264. Id.
265. 106 N.M.

325, 742 P.2d 537 (Ct. App. 1987).

266. Id. at 327, 742 P.2d at 539.
267. Id.
268. 111 N.M. 536, 807 P.2d 234 (Ct. App. 1991).
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Appeals ruled on an issue that was not properly preserved in the trial
court on the basis that the issue involved the general public interest. 269
The appeal revolved around a Workers' Compensation Division award
of benefits to Delores Pineda for the death of her husband. The husband's death occurred in the course of his employment with Grande
Drilling Company. 270 The award included attorney's fees based upon a
statute that went into effect after the filing of the action. 27 1 Grande
Drilling appealed the award of the fees arguing that the fees could not
have been awarded under the statute in effect at the time the claim
was filed.2 72 The appellate court addressed the issue of whether the new
statute could be validly applied to a case filed before the statute took
273
effect.
The court of appeals found that Grande Drilling had failed to raise
this particular issue before the Workers' Compensation Judge and had
failed to raise it in its initial appellate briefs. 7 4 The court found, however,
that this issue could be heard for the first time on appeal because it
involved a general public interest. 275 The court recognized the public
interest exception in the rules of appellate procedure 276 and decided that
the award of attorney's fees should be reversed because the fees could
2 77
not be awarded under the statute in effect at the time of filing.
The court alerted the bar and the Worker's Compensation Division
that new regulations would not apply to any case filed before the
regulations went into effect. 278 Thus, the court essentially invoked its
power to decide public interest questions simply in order to send a
message to the legal community.
Although the use of the public interest exception in this case appears
broad, 279 the court carefully avoided making Pineda an all-embracing
precedent. Notably, the court expressly stated that it would not invariably
use the public interest exception to consider all challenges to the validity
of statutes.2 80 Thus, the court implied that not all issues relating to the
validity and application of statutes fall within the general public interest
exception.
In addition, the court pointed out that the issue was arguably a
jurisdictional question and thus fit within the jurisdictional question

269. Id. at 540, 807 P.2d 238.
270. Id. at 537, 807 P.2d 235.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 540, 807 P.2d 238.
274. Id.at 539, 807 P.2d 237.
275. Id.
276. See N.M. R. App. P. 12-216(B).
277. Pineda, 111 N.M. at 540, 807 P.2d at 238.
278. Id.
279. The use of the exception seems broad in the sense that if the court did not limit the precedential
value of this case, practitioners could have cited the case as standing for the proposition that any
challenge to a statute can be heard for the first time on appeal because it is in the public interest
to have the court instruct the bar on the proper application of the statute.
280. Pineda, II1 N.M. at 540, 807 P.2d at 238.
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exception. 28 ' By doing this the court left open the possibility of future
interpretation of whether the public interest exception alone is enough
to allow the review of a statute. 28 2 By not solely relying on the public
interest exception the court impliedly limited its application. 283
Another case decided during this survey period involved appellate
review of a jurisdictional question. In C.E. Alexander & Sons, Inc. v.
DEC International, Inc. ,284 the New Mexico Supreme Court decided a
breach of warranty case involving an arrangement in which DEC sold
the Alexander company some milking equipment. 28 1 Upon purchasing
the equipment, Alexander entered into a separate trade agreement with
Mr. Buster Goff in which Goff gave Alexander registered cows in
exchange for unregistered cows. 2 6 As part of the trade agreement with
Alexander, Goff retained a partial interest in the registered cows. 287
After the installation of the milking equipment, Alexander's cows
developed a fairly common udder infection. 28 Alexander sued DEC for
breach of warranty on the basis that the DEC equipment was responsible
for the udder infection. 289 A jury returned a verdict against DEC and
29
DEC appealed. 0
The issue on appeal was whether the appellate court had jurisdiction
over a matter when a necessary and indispensable party was not joined
in the litigation. 29' DEC argued that Goff was a necessary and indispensable party because his interests were inextricably tied with Alexander's claim. 292 According to DEC, Goff's interests and Alexander's
interests were tied because both retained partial interest in the registered
cows. 293 Goff's nonjoinder, DEC argued, created a jurisdictional defect
that divested the court of the power to hear the appeal. 294
.The court found that DEC failed to raise the nonjoinder issue in the
trial court. 295 Relying on precedent, however, the court found that it
296
could rule on the issue since the issue involved a jurisdictional question.
281. Id. (citing State v. Patten, 41 N.M. 395, 69 P.2d 931 (1937), as a case that defines the
subject-matter jurisdiction of a tribunal).
282. This case now either stands for the proposition that validity of statute issues are jurisdictional
questions or the proposition that validity of statute issues involve the general public interest or both.
Impliedly, the weight of this case as precedent is limited.
283. It is still best to specifically preserve issues in the trial court, especially considering the limited
use of the exceptions. Moreover, after Pineda attorneys may want to "piggy back" a public interest
exception argument with other exceptions in order to increase the chances of appellate review.
284. 112 N.M. 89, 811 P.2d 899 (1991).
285. Id. at 90, 811 P.2d at 900.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 91, 811 P.2d at 901.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. The court relied upon Sellman v. Haddock, 62 N.M. 391, 310 P.2d 1045 (1957), overruled
on other grounds, Safeco Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelty & Guar. Co., 101 N.M. 148, 679 P.2d
816 (1984), as precedent for the proposition that the joinder issue could be raised for the first time
on appeal.
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time on appeal and did
Thus, the issue could be raised for the first
297
not have to be preserved in the trial court.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court ruling against DEC. 29 In
so doing, the court stated that the failure to join a party did not create
a jurisdictional defect. 299 The court expressly overturned previous case
law which had held that failure to join an indispensable party was in
fact a jurisdictional defect. 3°° The court reasoned that rule 19 of the
New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure 30 ' gave the trial court the discretion
to do a factual balancing test to determine whether a party was indispensable.30 2 The court decided that appellate courts were not in a
good position to administer this balancing test. 303 Therefore, the court
held that the nonjoinder issue would no longer be considered jurisdictional. 30 4 Therefore, the nonjoinder question must be preserved in the
trial court if it is to be reviewed.
The practitioner should be aware of this case for two reasons. First,
the case changed the law regarding nonjoinder issues in that they are
no longer jurisdictional questions. Therefore, the issue must be preserved
in the trial court if it is to be reviewable by the court. More importantly,
however, an attorney should be aware of the court's strong reiteration
of the rule that appellate courts are not in a position to do a factual
balancing test. 30 5 Not only must the legal question be preserved below
but the factual predicate supporting the appellant's view must also be
preserved below. If a party fails to preserve sufficient evidence in the
record, the court most likely will leave the trial court's ruling undisturbed .36

D. Conclusion
The appellate courts repeatedly say that they will not decide issues
that are not properly preserved in the trial court. Preservation is necessary

297. Alexander, 112 N.M. at 91, 811 P.2d at 901.
298. Id. at 96, 811 P.2d at 906.
299. Id. at 91, 811 P.2d at 901.
300. Id. (court expressly overturned Holguin v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist., 91 N.M. 398, 575
P.2d 88 (1977)).
301. N.M. R. Crv. P. 1-019.
302. Alexander, 112 N.M. at 91, 811 P.2d at 901. In Sellman, 62 N.M. 391, 310 P.2d 1045, the
court cited to the rule of civil procedure regarding joinder of parties but still held that the nonjoinder issue was jurisdictional and could be raised in the appellate courts. Since Sellman, the rule
has changed to give the trial Zourt much more discretion over the facts surrounding the non-joinder
of an indispensable party. Compare N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-019 with N.M. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (Comp.
1953). Because the trial court can now apply the factual balancing test, the non-joinder question
becomes one of fact rather than one of jurisdiction.
303. Alexander, 112 N.M. at 92, 811 P.2d at 902.
304. Id. at 91, 811 P.2d at 901.
305. In this case, the court impliedly reasoned that the applicable rule of civil procedure had
changed enough to make the non-joinder issue a question of fact to be decided in the trial court
and not a question of jurisdiction. This change in the rule essentially divested the appellate courts
of jurisdiction over non-joinder issues not raised in the trial court because the appellate courts do
not have the appropriate tools to determine the facts and apply the balancing test.
306. The court implied this proposition when it noted the sanctity of judgments rendered by the
trial court. Alexander, 112 N.M. at 96, 811 P.2d at 906 (court should indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the judgment).
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because the appellate courts only review the record from the trial court
for error and do not make evidentiary or factual findings.30 7 Thus,
unless an issue falls within one of the exceptions to the general rule,
the court will not review any issue that is not sufficiently preserved in
the trial court.
Exceptions to this rule allow appellate courts to review all jurisdictional
questions, or questions involving the general public interest, fundamental
error, or the fundamental rights of a party. The courts are not quick
to use these exceptions, however, and generally limit their application
even when they do use them.30 8 Thus the best course of action is for
counsel to properly and fully preserve all issues in the trial court. 31 9
Failure to do so could cost a client the right to have the issue reviewed
by an appellate court.
IV.

3 10
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Even though a party satisfies all of the jurisdictional requirements
and properly preserves all of his or her issues for appeal, that party
still might not be able to win on the merits of the appeal. The appellate
courts employ certain standards or burdens of proof that must be met
in order to win an appeal.3 " ' If these standards or burdens cannot be
met, the party will lose his or her appeal on the merits. These standards
and burdens are generally known as "standards of review."
Standards of review can come in many forms. The standards may
be based upon the amount of deference that the appellate court is
willing to give. For instance, appellate courts typically will defer to the
trial court's findings and conclusions. 12 In addition, the appellate courts
generally limit their interpretation of statutes by deferring to the leg33
islature's judgment or political role.
Furthermore, the standards may be established based on how much
the court is willing to scrutinize the constitutionality of a person's,
group's, or governmental entity's actions. 3a 4 The standard may also be

307. Id. at 92, 811 P.2d at 902.
308. See Pineda v. Grande Drilling Corp., III N.M. 536, 807 P.2d 234 (Ct. App. 1991).
309. An attorney may be wise to object or otherwise preserve anything that might even possibly
become an appealable issue. The practitioner, however, should be aware of rule 11 which could cause
an attorney or a party to get sanctioned for frivolous motions. See N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-011.
310. This survey will only address the standard of review following a trial and judgment. It does
not cover the standards of review for appeals from summary judgment, directed verdict, or the like.
In addition, it does not cover the standards of review for appeals from non-final judgments.
311. See, e.g., Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 798 P.2d 571 (1990) (court held
that intermediate scrutiny applied to plaintiff's equal protection claim); Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas
Best Freight), 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363 (Ct. App.) (whole record review applied to workers'
compensation appeals), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 33, 781 P.2d 305 (1988).
312. See Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Harmon, 102 N.M. 166, 692 P.2d 1315 (1984); Mascarenas v.
Gonzales, 83 N.M. 749, 497 P.2d 751 (Ct. App. 1972) (reviewing court will view facts in favor of
the prevailing party, will allow all reasonable inferences that support the verdict, and will disregard
evidence not favorable to the verdict).
313. See generally Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968).
314. See Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 798 P.2d 571 (1990), for a discussion
of the three tiers of scrutiny that are applied to constitutional law cases.
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based upon a statute or rule of procedure. 3" Finally, the standard may
36
be based upon principles established in previous case law.
A.

General Standard of Review Rules

1. Deference Given to Trial Court Judgment
The appellate courts give substantial deference to the trial court's
judgment.31 7 New Mexico appellate courts will accept all inferences in
favor of the verdict and disregard any inferences to the contrary. 1 8 In
addition, the appellate courts will not disturb the judgment of the trial
court as to the facts established by the evidence unless such facts are
not supported by substantial evidence. 1 9 Furthermore, appellate courts
will affirm the trial court ruling even if the trial court relies upon the
wrong rationale, but the judgment is inherently correct.3 20 Thus, the
disturb the ruling if it is the "correct result
appellate courts will not
'32
for a wrong reason." '
Finally, appellate courts will not overturn a verdict or judgment when
there is harmless error.3 2 By definition, harmless error is an error that
would not affect the result of the case. 23 The rationale for the harmless
error rule is that the role of the appellate courts is to correct wrong
results not correct errors that could not change the result. 324 Therefore,
like the "right for the wrong reason" rule, the appellate courts will
affirm a trial court decision that is not free from error so long as the
error is harmless.
2. Limitations on the Interpretations of Statutes
Aside from the trial court decision, a party may try to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute as part of its appeal. Counsel should note,

315. See, e.g., N.M. R. App. P. 12-207(D) (establishes standard of review for setting aside district
court's decisions regarding supersedeas bonds); N.M. R. Evm. 11-103 (establishes burden of proof
required to have case heard on plain error grounds); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-3-4(F) (establishes standard
of review in cases regarding the Public Assistance Appeals Act).
316. Although this concept is difficult to support in general, one only needs to look at recent
workers' compensation cases like Evans v. Valley Diesel, Ill N.M. 556, 807 P.2d 740 (1991), to
see that the standard of review for workers' compensation cases is based upon the "whole record"
review that is stated in Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight), 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363 (Ct.
App.). This "whole record" review typically applies to all cases being appealed from administrative
agencies.
317. See generally Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Harmon, 102 N.M. 166, 692 P.2d 1315 (1984).
318. Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Harmon, 102 N.M. 166, 168-69, 692 P.2d 1315, 1317-18 (1984); Mascarenas
v. Gonzales, 83 N.M. 749, 751, 497 P.2d 751, 753 (Ct. App. 1972).
319. Getz v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 90 N.M. 195, 198, 561 P.2d 468, 471 (1977); Anaconda
Co. v. Property Tax Dep't, 94 N.M. 202, 608 P.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 94 N.M.
628, 614 P.2d 545 (1980).
320. H.T. Coker Constr. Co. v. Whitfield Transp., Inc., 85 N.M. 802, 805, 518 P.2d 782, 785
(Ct. App. 1974).
321. Id.
322. Jewell v. Seidenberg, 82 N.M. 120, 477 P.2d 296 (1970).
323. Id. at 124, 477 P.2d at 300; see also Gough v. Famariss Oil & Ref. Co., 83 N.M. 710, 496
P.2d 1106 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 83 N.M. 698, 496 P.2d 1094 (1972).
324. Gough, 83 N.M. 710, 496 P.2d 1106.
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however, that the power of the appellate court to find a statute unconstitutional is somewhat limited. This is because of the fact that
appellate courts give deference to the legislature.3 25
Generally, the appellate courts will not find legislative acts unconstitutional unless no other conclusion can be reached.3 26 In reviewing
the statute, the court will construe each word or phrase in connection
with every other word, phrase or portion, in order to determine the
legislative purpose.3 27 All questions or doubts are resolved in favor of
constitutionality.3 28 Therefore, a party must be very persuasive when
arguing the legislative purpose of the statute violates the constitution.3 29
330
3. Other Standards of Review
Appellate review of the merits of a case is typically limited to the
determination of whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported
by substantial evidence and whether the trial court properly applied the
law. " ' Factual determinations can only be set aside where the decision
of the trial court is based on facts not supported by substantial evi3 32
dence.
While there are many standards of review for many situations, the
non-deferential 33 standards that seem to be most used or most important
are the substantial evidence test, abuse of discretion standard, constitutional scrutiny standards, and whole record review.

a. Substantial Evidence Test
If an issue before the appellate court is a factual issue, then the court
applies the substantial evidence test. 334 That is, the appellate court
determines whether the findings of fact entered by the trial court are
supported by substantial evidence. 335 Substantial evidence is defined as
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. 336 Appellate courts will not reweigh the evidence

325. See Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968). Appellate courts give more deference
to legislative enactments than to trial court decisions. This is in part due to the separation of powers
doctrine set forth in article III of the New Mexico Constitution which limits the judiciary's control
over the legislature. See N.M. CONST. art. Ill, § 1.
326. Peyton, 78 N.M. at 725, 437 P.2d at 724.
327. Id. at 724-25, 437 P.2d at 723-24.
328. Id. at 725, 437 P.2d at 724.
329. See id.
330. This article does not attempt to address all standards of review for all situations. Instead,

this section will attempt to set out the most used or most important standards.
331. Esquibel v. Hallmark, 92 N.M. 254, 255-56, 586 P.2d 1083, 1084-85 (1978).
332. Groff v. Circle K Corp., 86 N.M. 531, 525 P.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1974).
333. Non-deferential standards are those standards that fall into the categories discussed immediately
proceeding this subsection.
334. See, e.g., Garcia v. Marquez, 101 N.M. 427, 684 P.2d 513 (1984).
335. Abbinett v. Fox, 103 N.M. 80, 86, 703 P.2d 177, 183 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 103 N.M.

62, 702 P.2d 1007 (1985).
336. Kueffer v. Kueffer, 110 N.M. 10, 12, 791 P.2d 461, 463 (1990); Den-Gar Enters. v. Romero,
94 N.M. 425, 429, 611 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 628, 614 P.2d 545 (1980).

APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Summer 1992]

to determine whether it supports an alternative result.33 7 In addition,
the appellate courts will not resolve conflicts in evidence338 but will
instead review the facts in a light most favorable to the prevailing
trial court findings that
party.3 3 9 Overall, the courts will not 3disturb
4
.
evidence
substantial
by
are supported
Abuse of Discretion Standard
Trial court judges are vested with wide discretion to rule on many
issues. When a judge uses this discretion to effectuate a judgment and
the judgment is appealed, the appellate courts review the trial court's
judgment under the abuse of discretion standard.3 4' Generally, the trial
court's discretion is only invoked when that court is asked to make a
legal conclusion.3 42 When a party challenges a legal conclusion, the
standard typically applied by the courts is whether the law was correctly
applied to the facts. 343 If the law was incorrectly applied, the appellate
courts would presumably overturn the trial court's decision.
b.

c. Review of Constitutional Claims
Appellate courts review constitutional claims using a three-tiered analysis. 3" The appellate court's skepticism towards an action or a law that
infringes upon some right or discriminates against some class will determine which tier or level of scrutiny will be applied. Knowing which
level of scrutiny will be applied could determine whether a party will
appeal because the strict scrutiny test is almost impossible to pass while
the rational basis test is quite easy to overcome.
The courts may require that the party that is infringing upon the
rights of others pass strict scrutiny. 345 Strict scrutiny requires that the
infringing party show that its actions advanced a compelling interest
by the least drastic means. 346 The courts may also apply heightened or
intermediate scrutiny which requires the infringing party to prove that

337. Abbinett, 103 N.M. at 86, 703 P.2d at 183.
338. See Thompson v. Getman, 74 N.M. 1, 389 P.2d 854 (1964).
339. Padilla v. Lawrence, 101 N.M. 556, 560, 685 P.2d 964, 968 (Ct. App. 1984).
340. Flinchum Constr. Co. v. Central Glass & Mirror Co., 94 N.M. 398, 400, 611 P.2d 221, 223
(1980). The policy rationale for this rule is that trial courts are in the best position to determine
the relevant facts of a case.
341. See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 111 N.M. 196, 803 P.2d 676 (Ct. App.) (grant of new trial will
be overturned only upon a showing of clear and manifest abuse of discretion), cert. denied, III
N.M. 144, 802 P.2d 1290 (1990).
342. This comes by definition because if a trial court is ruling on an issue then it is making a
legal conclusion based upon the facts of the case. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Moutray, 91 N.M. 205,
572 P.2d 933 (1977) (trial court decided that pre-judgment interest should not be awarded under the
facts of the case).
343. Texas Nat'l Theaters, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 97 N.M. 282, 287, 639 P.2d 569, 574

(1982).
344. See generally Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 798 P.2d 571 (1990).
345. Id.

346. Id. at 623 n.2, 798 P.2d at 573 n.2 (citing Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984)).
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its actions are substantially related to an important interest.3 47 Finally,
the courts may apply the rational basis test which simply requires a
showing that the actions of the infringing party are rationally related
4
to a legitimate interest.
d. Whole Record Review
The final standard of review that is most often employed by the
appellate court is the "whole record" standard of review.3 49 While this
standard is generally only applied to cases originating in administrative
agencies, it warrants discussion in this article because the appellate
courts, hearing cases appealed from the district courts, apply the same
standard as the district courts hearing appeals from the administrative
agencies. 3 0 Thus, in these civil appeals from the district courts, the
appellate courts apply the whole record standard of review. 35
The whole record review is limited to the question of whether there
is substantial evidence on the whole record to support the decision of
the trial court."5 2 This differs from the ordinary "substantial evidence"
test in that the whole record review determines whether the decision of
the trial court is justified whereas the substantial evidence test determines
whether specific findings of facts are supported." Additionally, whole
record review does not necessarily give deference to the trial court's
decision because the appellate court can make an independent judgment
if the trial court's decision is not supported by substantial evidence.35 4
B.

Recent Cases
The appellate courts decided two cases relating to the standard of
review in civil cases during the past survey year.3 5 Both cases involved
the "whole record" standard of review.3 5 6 Through the decisions the
court refined this standard and in some ways brought it in line with
the more traditional standards of review.

347. Id. (citing Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., 107 N.M. 688, 693, 763 P.2d
1153, 1158 (1988)).

348. Id. at 628, 798 P.2d at 578.
349. Although this is really not an exception, "whole record" review gives little or no deference
to the trial court's judgment and the appellate court does not really look for abuse of discretion.
In essence, the court gives the parties a new hearing based upon the record at each stage of the
appeal. See Watson v. Town Council of Bernalillo, Ill N.M. 374, 376, 805 P.2d 641, 643 (Ct. App.
1991) (court observed that parties get de novo review each time an appeal is made).
350. Watson v. Town Council of Bernalillo, Ill N.M. 374, 376, 805 P.2d 641, 643 (Ct. App.
1991).
351. Id.
352. Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight), 108 N.M. 124, 128, 767 P.2d 363, 367 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 109 N.M. 33, 781 P.2d 305 (1988).

353. Compare Tallman, 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363 with Abbinett, 103 N.M. 80, 703 P.2d 177.
354. See Trujillo v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 105 N.M. 467, 470, 734 P.2d 245, 248 (Ct. App.
1987); see also Kelly & Gilmore, Administrative Law, 19 N.M.L. REv. 575, 616-19 (1989).
355. Watson v. Town Council of Bernalillo, I I I N.M. 374, 805 P.2d 641 (Ct. App. 1991); Evans
v. Valley Diesel, I ll N.M. 556, 807 P.2d 740 (1991).
356. Watson, I I I N.M. at 376, 805 P.2d at 643; Evans, 1 !1 N.M. at 558, 807 P.2d at 742.
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3
In Watson v. Town Council of Bernalillo" the court of appeals faced
a zoning issue that originated when Eugene Watson and others brought
8
suit to stop the annexation of land." A gypsum wallboard manufacturer
wanted to annex the land in order to construct and operate a manufacturing plant. 5 9 Watson and other protestors, citing health and welfare
concerns, 3 fought the annexation of the land and the construction of
the plant. 6
The manufacturer proposed its annexation plan to the Bernalillo
Zoning Commission, which in turn recommended to the Bernalillo Town
36
Council that the plan be accepted. ' Over the objections of the protestors, the town council accepted the plan and approved the annexation
used
of the land. 62 The protestors appealed to the district court which
decision. 363
council's
the
uphold
to
review
of
standard
record
the whole
decision. 3 6
The protestors then appealed the district court's
The court of appeals applied the "whole record" standard of review
to the case on the basis that this case involved the appeal of an
administrative opinion.3 65 Using this standard, the court found that there
court's
was substantial evidence on the record to support the district
367
decision.
court's
district
366
the
decision. Therefore, the court affirmed
In affirming, the court of appeals did an extensive analysis of the
3 Central to the court's analysis was
whole record standard of review.
court of appeals applied the
the fact that the district court and the
36 9
Both courts were required to
same standard of review on appeal.
council
review all evidence bearing on the finding or decision ofthethe
370
result.
support
to
evidence
"to determine if there was substantial
As the court said, "an appellant in effect gets the benefit of a de novo
appellate review, which not even a defendant convicted of a capital
offense receives." 37 1 The court, however, felt obliged to follow supreme
court precedent and could only call upon the supreme court to somehow
limit the whole record review when it reaches the second-tier of judicial

review

372

The supreme court impliedly answered this call in Evans v. Valley

Diesel.373 In Evans, a worker received injuries while working on his
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

!11 N.M. 374, 805 P.2d 641 (Ct. App. 1991).

Id. at 375, 805 P.2d at 642.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 376, 805 P.2d at 643.
Id.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 383, 805 P.2d at 649.
Id.
Id. at 376-77, 805 P.2d at 643.44.
Id. at 376, 805 P.2d at 643.
Id.
Id. at 377, 805 P.2d at 644.
Id.
111 N.M. 556, 807 P.2d 740 (1991).
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personal vehicle in his employer's garage. 3 4 The workers' compensation
judge determined that the worker was injured during the scope of his
employment and awarded him benefits.3 7 The employer appealed to the
court of appeals.3 76 The court of appeals applied the whole record
standard of review and determined that the evidence on the record was
not sufficient enough to support the findings of the workers' compensation judge. 377 The court of appeals reversed the award of benefits and
the worker appealed.378
On appeal, the supreme court also applied the whole record standard
of review, as was required by precedent. 79 In doing so, however, the
court reviewed not only the sufficiency of evidence based upon the
whole record, but also reviewed the correctness of the court of appeals'
opinion. 380 The supreme court found that the court of appeals incorrectly
applied the whole record standard. 38' The supreme court said that even
under the whole record standard the reviewing court must start out
with the perception that all evidence will be viewed in the light most
favorable to the agency's decision. 38 2 The court of appeals had made
an independent finding of the facts and thus misapplied the whole record
standard. 38 3 In addition, the supreme court said the court of appeals
incorrectly found that the evidence was not sufficient to support the
agency's findings.18 Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the decision
of the court of appeals and reinstated the award of benefits.3 5
When examining Evans in light of the decision and analysis of Watson,
counsel can see that the whole record standard of review can no longer
be considered a complete de novo appellate hearing, as was feared in
Watson. This can be inferred from the fact that the supreme court
reviewed both the correctness of the agency's determination and the
correctness of the decision by the court of appeals. The Evans court
was able to review the sufficiency of evidence and also review both the
findings of fact and the application of law made by the court of appeals.
This implies that the whole record standard will no longer be used just
to review the agency's fact finding for a second time but will also be
able to review the correctness of the trial court's decision.
In addition, the Evans court brought the whole record standard more
in line with traditional standards by pointing out that the reviewing

374. Id. at 557, 807 P.2d at 741.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 558, 807 P.2d at 742. The court cited Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight), 108
N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 33, 781 P.2d 305 (1988), as the precedent
that requires the reviewing court to use the whole record standard.
380. Evans, III N.M. at 558-59, 807 P.2d at 742-43.
381. Id. at 558, 807 P.2d at 742.
382. Id. at 559, 807 P.2d at 743.
383. Id.
384. Id.

385. Id. at 560, 807 P.2d at 744.
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court must give deference to the trial court's findings of fact if the
8 6 This is equivalent to
findings are supported by substantial evidence.
fact in most civil cases.
of
the traditional deference given to the finders
C. Conclusion
The New Mexico appellate courts apply standards of review to all
appeals. The standard may result from the deference that the appellate
court gives to either the trial court's decision or the legislative body's
judgment. Furthermore, the standards may result from statutes, appellate
rules, or principles established in previous New Mexico case law.
It is important to know which standard of review will be used by
the appellate courts for at least two reasons. First, if a party knows
which standard of review will be applied then that party can accurately
evaluate the likelihood of success and decide whether to appeal. If the
appealing party realizes that he or she has to meet a very high standard
of review, that party may forego the appeal because of the minimal
likelihood of success. Second, if the party decides to go ahead with
his or her appeal, that party will need to know what burden of proof
it must meet to win. Either way, the first item of research for any
attorney should be to determine what burden of proof or standard of
review has to be satisfied to win the appeal.
V.

CONCLUSION

Every aggrieved party has the statutory right to appeal a trial court
decision to the New Mexico Supreme Court or the New Mexico Court
of Appeals.38 7 To invoke this right, however, aggrieved parties must
follow the New Mexico Rules of Appellate Procedure. Aggrieved parties
may lose their right to an appeal if they fail to follow these rules.
This survey article attempts to address some of the pitfalls that can
cost an aggrieved party the right to have his or her appeal reviewed.
Practitioners must realize that if they do not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements such as time-of-filing and place-of-filing then they run the
risk of having their client's appeal dismissed. Furthermore, if counsel
appeals a non-final order or fails to properly preserve an issue in the
trial court or in the docketing statement, then the whole appeal or at
least some of the issues generally will not be reviewed. Finally, even
if counsel follows all the rules and preserves all the issues, the likelihood
of success on appeal might be limited because the appellate courts apply
certain standards of review.
There are exceptions to all of these rules, but attorneys should not
count on the exceptions. Instead, attorneys should try to win the case
at trial or, at a minimum, preserve all issues for review. If a party has
to appeal, then he or she should follow all of the rules of appellate

386. Id. at 559, 807 P.2d at 743.
387. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
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procedure in order to secure review of the merits of the appeal. On
appeal, the aggrieved party should know which type of standard the
appellate court will apply so that he or she can meet the correct burden
of proof. If an aggrieved party follows these steps then that party will
be able to assess whether there is a reasonable probability of prevailing
on appeal.
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